WATER JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA:
NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY AT THE INTERSECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL POWER
Rose Francis

ABSTRACT:
This paper analyzes water as a social justice issue in South Africa, a nation that
has undergone tremendous political and legal transformations over the last
fifteen years, but whose population nonetheless continues to suffer from severe
inequities in access to freshwater resources. In light of growing water scarcity
worldwide, this paper highlights that legal treatment of water resources has
significant socioeconomic and distributive justice impacts, even in progressive
constitutional democracies that have embraced principles of human rights and
international legal norms. The paper explores historical changes in South
African water law and evaluates the current political and legal status of water
resources within the Constitutional system. Finally, the paper analyzes a
potential Constitutional challenge to contemporary national water policy and
concludes that, in this nation where socioeconomic conditions are so closely
linked to water resources, exerting organized political pressure on elected
officials to amend existing water laws may be a more effective strategy than
litigation to achieve progressive social change.

Candidate for J.D., Harvard Law School, June 2005.

DRAFT COPY – March 2005

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3

II. THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID ....................................................................................... 7
III. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBALIZATION ........................... 9
IV. TRANSFORMATIONS IN WATER LAW AND POLICY .....................................................15
A. Decentralized Management and Funding Shortages................................................20
B. Cost Recovery ...........................................................................................................24
C. Privatization..............................................................................................................28

V. ANALYZING THE RIGHT TO WATER ...........................................................................32
A. Water as a Human Right...........................................................................................32
B. South Africa’s Free Basic Water Policy ...................................................................36
C. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Water .......................................................42
1. A Roadmap for Litigating Socioeconomic Rights ..............................................43
2. The Viability of Litigating the Right to Water....................................................47

VI. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................52

2

DRAFT COPY – March 2005

I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of South Africa is a nation of extreme disparities, which are the legacy of two
centuries of European colonial rule and fifty years of formal apartheid. Despite its status of
moderate national wealth, inside South Africa’s borders, developed and developing worlds
coexist, and the brutal, racist policies of the National Party, which ruled the country until 1994,
have left the inhabitants of those two worlds largely segregated by pigmentation.1 Thus, white
South Africans, who comprise just 10% of the population, predominantly live in conditions
equivalent to those found in wealthy nations, while more than a third of the population subsists
on less than US$2 per day and unemployment for the black African population ranges between
30 – 60%.2 The stark inequalities between blacks and whites is also reflected in municipal water
services: all- white suburbs account for more than 50% of residential water use, and as of 2000,
only 27% of black households had running water, compared to a striking 96% of white
households.3 As one commentator has stated, “[South Africa] has yet to recover from an
apartheid system in which whites were afforded all the services expected in a modern society,
while blacks lived in third-world conditions…”4
The country is combating a major backlog in basic water service provision to rural and periurban poor communities – over 12 million people do not have access to potable water for
1

Karen Cavanaugh, Emerging South Africa: Human Rights Responses in the Post-Apartheid Era, 5 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 293 (1997). Not surprisingly, in this nation of sharp inequalities, the richest 10% of the
population is responsible for almost 50% of consumption and the poorest 10% is responsible for only 1.1%.
Andrew Allan, A Comparison Between the Water Law Reforms in South Africa and Scotland: Can a Generic
National Water Law Model Be Developed from These Examples?, 43 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 419, n.8 (2003).
2
Rena Singer, South Africa: To Tap Votes, Politicians Promise Water with Less than a Month Before Elections,
Politicians of All Hues are Pitching the Basic Infrastructure, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, November 7, 2000; Jon
Jeter, South Africa's Driest Season, 27 (6) MOTHER JONES 39(2002), available at
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2002/11/ma_145_01.html. Unemployment rates range from 32-43% for
black African men and 40-58% for black African women, and two million households live in one-room dwellings,
94% of which are black African families. Barbara Schreiner et al., Washing Away Poverty: Water, Democracy and
Gendered Poverty Eradication in South Africa, 28(3) NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 171, 172-73 (2004).
3
Id. Singer, supra n.2.
4
Id.
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drinking, eating, and bathing, and 18 million people lack adequate sanitation.5 Those without
running water in their homes either travel to communal taps for potable water or collect water
from natural sources, such as rivers, streams, dam reservoirs, boreholes, rainwater tanks, and
even stagnant ponds.6 Water quality is thus an additional concern, as pollution levels are
increasing as a result of effluent released by the growing industrial and mining sectors, fecal
contamination resulting from lack of sanitation infrastructure and leaking sewers, and
domesticated animals grazing too close to water sources.7 The democratically-elected
government that took office in 1994 has made a concerted effort to extend basic water services
(both drinking water and sanitation) to millions of inhabitants in poor communities,8 but those

5

Marna De Lange, Water Law and Human Rights – Roles and Responsibilities, 43(4) WATER SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY 143 (2001). The total estimated population of South Africa is 45 milllion. Singer, supra n.2. See
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 172-73 (putting forth a figure of 28% for access to potable water, which, multiplied by a
population of 45 million, yields 12.5 million, and 40% for sanitation, which yields 18 million). See also Farah
Khan, Health – South Africa: High Water Fees Cited in Cholera Outbreak, INTER PRESS SERV., October 17, 2000
(citing 12 million people still without access). Cf. DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, IMPLEMENTATION
STATUS OF FREE BASIC WATER PROJECT, at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/FreeBasicWater/Defaulthome.asp (last visited
January 31, 2005) (on file with Author) (indicating in table form that as of January 31, 2005, 15,309,603 persons
still had not been served with free basic water) (last visited January 31, 2005) [hereinafter DWAF,
IMPLEMENTATION STATUS], and Ferial Haffajee, South Africa: Water For Everyone (What Price Water?), UNESCO
COURIER, February 1, 1999 (indicating that over 2/3 of the population lacks access to basic sanitation). Those
households without flush toilets or chemical toilets must resort to pit latrines and buckets (and outdoor locations).
Barbara A. Anderson et al, Environment, Access to Health Care, and Other Factors Affecting Infant and Child
Survival Among the African and Coloured Populations of South Africa, 1989–94, 23(4) POPULATION &
ENVIRONMENT 349, 355 (2002). For a definition of peri-urban, see infra n.24.
6
As of 1998, rural residents traveled, on average, 1/3 of a mile to get water for household use. South Africa: The
Water Services Act, INT'L MKT. INSIGHT TRADE OPPORTUNITIES INQUIRIES, September 22, 1998. Singer, supra n.2.
See also David A. McDonald, The Bell Tolls for Thee: Cost Recovery, Cutoffs, and the Affordability of Municipal
Services in South Africa, in COST RECOVERY AND THE CRISIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 161, 163
(David A. McDonald & John Pape eds., Human Sciences Research Council 2002) (Table 8.1 lists categories of
survey responses to the question, “Where do you get your drinking water?”). According to a survey conducted in
1994, among those who do not have access to piped, potable water, 89% did nothing to treat the water before
drinking it. Anderson, supra n.5, at 361-62.
7
See De Lange, supra n.5, and South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6.
8
It is worth noting that plans for water service extension mean communal taps for most black communities (with the
stated objective of no tap being more than 200 meters from any household), as compared to the running water
already in place in most white homes. Charles Johnson, Privatizing Water: Political Intrigue And Free-Market
Economics In South Africa, 20(4) MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 13 (1999). However, during National Water Week
2004, the Minister of DWAF is reported as having said that the government’s vision over the next ten years is to
‘move people up the water ladder, from communal taps to the convenience and dignity of water in people's own
yards, with each household having its own toilet and, in time, to provide hot and cold running water inside their
homes.’ Saving Water, Supplying Water, SouthAfrica.info reporter, at
http://www.southafrica.info/10years/waterweek2004.htm (March 19, 2004) (on file with Author).
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served thus far represent only a fraction of the population without access,9 and many of those
communities that have received water services suffer from substandard delivery systems and lack
of maintenance, as well as rising water prices and service cutoffs.10
Insufficient and inadequate infrastructure for delivering water services to poor communities
is compounded by the relative scarcity of national freshwater resources. South Africa has few
rivers, no mountain snow pack, and a mean annual rainfall that is substantially less than the
world average.11 Furthermore, due to extremely high evaporation rates, 92% of the limited
rainfall returns to the atmosphere before ever reaching a river or stream, and only 60% of mean
annual runoff can be utilized as a source of fresh water.12 Seasonal variability and unpredictable
periods of drought strain the country’s water supply, and historical human settlement patterns
around mineral deposits (rather than water sources) have led to a “geographic mismatch between
water availability and water need”.13 Thus, in most populous areas, water must be imported from
other basins, and some regions are entirely dependent on water generated outside their
boundaries.14 Meanwhile, domestic demand for water is projected to continue increasing as a
function of both population growth and expected improvements in average living standards, but
since the apartheid regime already directed large sums of political and financial capital toward

9

The figures for the number of people without access to basic water services in 1994 and in 2004 range, as do the
figures for the number of people who have been served thus far. Compare De Lange, supra n.5 (stating that 12
million lacked access in 1994, but that by 1999, the government had successfully supplied 5 million of those persons
with access), with Jay O’Keeffe, Future Water Availability in South Africa, 18(7) WORLD & I (2003) (stating that 17
million lacked access in 1994, and that by 2003, 7 million people had been served), and DWAF, IMPLEMENTATION
STATUS, supra n.5 (indicating in table form that as of January 2005, over 15 million persons still have not been
provided free basic water under the national policy of Free Basic Water instituted in 2001).
10
O’Keeffe, supra n.9. See generally COST RECOVERY AND THE CRISIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA
(David A. McDonald & John Paper eds., 2002).
11
South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6. See also G. Du T. de Villiers et al, South Africa's Water
Resources and the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme: A Partial Solution to the Country's Water Problems, 12(1)
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 65, 65 (1996).
12
O’Keeffe, supra n.9. See also de Villiers, supra n.11, at 66. In fact, in some regions evaporation rates
occasionally exceed annual rainfall. South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6.
13
O’Keeffe, supra n.9.
14
de Villiers, supra n.11, at 67.
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the development of water resources to support irrigated agriculture in an arid climate, existing
water supplies can only be augmented at an increasing cost.15 As of 1998, the nation was using
two thirds of its water supply, which prompted the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to
state that if the water use patterns that had developed during apartheid continue unaltered, South
Africa may consume all of its available water within thirty years.16 Thus, at some point in the
near future, redistribution of current water allocations will be necessary to alleviate existing
inequalities, making access to water resources a poignant social justice issue as well as a serious
structural problem.
***
The organization of this paper proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the relationship between
the apartheid legal regime and current natural resource inequities, while Part IIIdescribes South
Africa’s transition to democracy and the new government’s development policy, including early
commitments to redistribution and subsequent structural adjustment strategies. Part IV outlines
post-apartheid transformations in water law and policy and evaluates the effects of these legal
changes. Part V explores the right to water in South Africa, from both a human rights and a
Constitutional perspective, and includes an analysis of South Africa’s recent commitment to free
basic water. Part V concludes that greater equity in access to water resources is needed, but that
the most effective instrument for change may not be public litigation in the Constitutional Court,

15

Id. at 68. See also Roger Bate & Richard Tren, THE COST OF FREE WATER: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF WATER
MISALLOCATION AND THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA 65-130 (Free Market Foundation, Johannesburg, 2002) (detailing
the evolution of water rights and irrigation policy in South Africa).
16
Kevin Debell, New National Water Law to Reverse Apartheid Wrong, 10(9) WATER ENVIRONMENT &
TECHNOLOGY 50 (1998). But cf. Wyndham Hartley, Cabinet Yes to R21bn to Build New Dams, BUSINESS DAY
(South Africa), September 2, 2004 (noting that government had just approved a national water resources strategy
that includes plans for the construction of twenty new dams in the next twenty years to meet the country’s water
needs), and NWRS, infra n.69,at 3 (emphasizing that there is “enough water to meet [the] nation’s needs for the
foreseeable future”, if the resource is managed properly).
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but rather, a politically mobilized civil society that can pressure elected officials to amend
current legislation regarding the budgeting and allocation of water resources.

II. THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID
The current disparities in access to basic water services are indirectly linked to the officially
discriminatory land policies inflicted on the population by the governing regime during the
apartheid era,17 during which the privilege of land ownership was reserved for the 11% of the
population with white skin.18 Most black citizens were prohibited from residing in urban areas
and could only have legal residence in crowded ‘homelands’.19 The ruling National Party used
influx control laws to prevent poor blacks from settling in cities where whites lived, and as a
result, impoverished townships and villages developed haphazardly along the peripheries,
supplying white-owned urban businesses with a cheap labor supply.20 The government also
forcibly relocated entire communities to arid rural locations with poor soil and limited water
resources, both to clear out unwanted shantytowns and to make room for commercial forestry,
agriculture, and National Parks on valuable land.21
Within this deeply segregated society, first-world and third-world economies developed
independently of one another, and the national government focused its attention and resources

17

South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6.
O’Keeffe, supra n.9. Discriminatory land policies trace back to the Natives Land Acts of 1913 and 1916, and the
Group Areas Act No. 41 of 1950, which classified residential areas according to race and reserved 87% of the land
for Afrikaners. These laws were abolished by the parliament in 1991. Cavanaugh, supra n.1 , at 292.
19
As of the 1990s, homelands constituted 13% of the land area, while black Africans constituted 74% of the total
population. Anderson, supra n.5, at 351.
20
See Jeter, supra n.2, and Thembi Khuzwayo, Challenges Facing the Developing Communities in South Africa,
14(3/4) WATER SUPPLY 20, 20 (1996), and Mark S. Kende, Economic Liberties Symposium Article, The South
African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 CHAP. L. REV.
137, 141 (2003).
21
See Debell, supra n.16, and Philip Woodhouse, Water Rights and Rural Restructuring in South Africa: A Case
Study from Eastern Transvaal, 11(4) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 527, 530-31,
538 (1995).
18
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almost universally on the former,22 which led to highly differential domestic servicing between
white suburbs and black townships.23 When the government loosened and dissolved its apartheid
residential policies in the early 1990s, many inhabitants of impoverished, outlying rural
settlements flocked to the cities in seek of economic opportunity, and this massive urban
migration further strained the infrastructure for providing municipal services in underserved periurban communities.24
Current discrepancies in the allocation of water can also be traced back to apartheid-era water
policies, which reserved the resource for the landed white minority through convoluted riparian
laws linking water rights to land ownership25 and the dispensation of government subsidies that
propped up white-owned, irrigated agriculture.26 Under this system, most available water was
used – inefficiently and virtually for free – by large-scale commercial farmers, a dominant group
with “privileged access to land, water, and economic power”.27 Even in cases where water
resources were developed in their vicinity, small-scale users and communal areas often were not
22

Khuzwayo, supra n.20, at 20.
Dhesigen Naidoo & George Constantinides, Integrated Approaches to Efficient Water Use in South Africa, 16(1)
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 155 (2000).
24
Khuzwayo, supra n.20, at 20. A useful definition of ‘peri-urban’ is provided by SANIPLAN dotORG, a webbased NGO that focuses on peri-urban sanitation and water supply:
The term "peri-urban" came into wide use during the 1980's in Europe. Literally, it means "around
the edges or periphery of a city." This definition includes (but is not limited to) the following
human settlement names from around the world: Barrio, bidonville, bustee, edge city, favela,
gecikondu, informal settlement, illegal settlement, kampung, legal settlement, pueblo invisible,
pueblo joven, shanty town, squatter settlement, tugurio, villa miserere, or whatever term may be
used to describe persons on the peripheries or edges of the usual, acknowleged official city zones.
Such settlements may be large, or they may be small. They may be longstanding, or they may be
of recent origin. They may be officially recognized or they may be ignored.
http://www.saniplan.org/defineng.htm (last visited January 29, 2005) (on file with author).
25
South Africa adopted the European model of riparian law to govern water allocation, which linked water rights to
land ownership and allowed landowners the right to access water on, under, and adjacent to their property. Haffajee,
supra n.5. For a more in-depth description of the riparian laws in place before the National Water Act of 1998 was
enacted, see Allan, supra n.1, at 428-30.
26
Such measures included drought relief and government-funded dam construction. David A. McDonald, No
Money, No Service: South Africa's Attempts to Recover Service Costs for Water and Power are Harming its Poorest
Citizens, 28(2) ALTERNATIVES JOURNAL 16 (2002). See also Haffajee, supra n.5.
27
CLAUDIOUS CHIKOZHO, TOWARDS COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE WATER
SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGES MADE UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND ZIMBABWEAN WATER
REFORMS 1-2 (Commons South Africa Occasional Paper Series No. 6, June 2001). See also Debell, supra n.16.
23
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provided access to the resource.28 The democratically-elected government reformed the nation’s
water laws in 1998, supplanting riparian law with a permit system that seemingly provides an
instrument for reallocation of water use in the public interest through a permit review process.29
However, no real redistribution has been achieved to date. As a practical matter, preexisting
allocations to farming, mining, and industry are grandfathered in through the issuance of
permits,30 regressive pricing for large-scale consumption continues,31 and as of 2003,
commercial agriculture was still using close to 60% of available water, while contributing to
only 1.4% of the GDP and employing just 1.4% of the nation’s workforce.32

III. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBALIZATION
In the early 1990s, South Africa formally began its transition from apartheid governance to a
constitutional democracy,33 and in the initial momentum, the nation made strong political and
institutional commitments to redress past injustices and redistribute resources and power along
more equitable lines. In 1990, the sitting President Frederik Willem de Klerk announced the end
of apartheid and released from prison Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National
Congress (ANC), the outlawed party that had been at the forefront of decades of struggle for
liberation from apartheid.34 The following year, a multiracial conference approved de Klerk’s

28

CHIKOZHO, supra n.27, at 1.
See id. at 9 (analyzing National Water Act of 1998, infra n.66). This concession is not terribly surprising, given
the scholarly prediction in 1995 that, “[T]he balance of power between the main claimants to water indicates that
those who currently have most access to water are well placed to maintain the status quo, even under [the proposed
and soon-to-be enacted system].” Woodhouse, supra n.21, at 540-41. For more on the modern permit system, see
discussion, infra Part IV.
30
See Wyndham Hartley, Kasrils Taps the Space Age to Monitor SA's Water, BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), June
14, 2002.
31
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
32
O’Keeffe, supra n.9. Cf. Naidoo, supra n.23 (stating that, as of 2000, white-owned commercial agriculture uses
54% of available water resources, a slightly smaller figure).
33
Cavanaugh, supra n.1 , at 295.
34
Id., at 292.
29
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referendums for constitutional reform, and after negotiations between de Klerk and Mandela, the
state enacted an interim constitution.35 In 1994, the first multiracial nationwide elections were
held, vaulting the ANC into power as the governing party for the first time in history.36 South
Africa then established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address the human rights
abuses of the outgoing apartheid government37 and a democratically-elected Constitutional
Assembly, whose purpose was to draft a new, permanent constitution.38 In the drafting process,
the Assembly incorporated ideas from individual citizens, civil society organizations, and
political parties, in what is referred to as the “largest public participation programme ever carried
out in South Africa”.39 The end product is an extremely progressive Constitution that embraces
human rights principles and contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights, which enshrines rights to
basic life necessities, including housing, a clean environment, health care, social security,
education, food, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, water.40

The African National Congress ("ANC"), Africa's oldest liberation movement, was founded in
1912 as the South African Native Congress. Its principal aim was to unite all the African people of
South Africa in opposition to racial discrimination. The inaugural conference brought together
African chiefs and intellectuals, many of whom had received some of their education overseas. It
was largely ineffective until a group of younger members, including Oliver Tambo and Nelson
Mandela, pushed the organization to take more militant positions beginning in the late 1940's. It
was banned by the South African Government in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre and many of
its members went into exile. After the banning, the ANC promoted internal resistance and an
armed campaign, led by its military wing, Umkhonto we Size, against apartheid. After it was
unbanned and its jailed members freed in 1990, the ANC quickly became South Africa's dominant
political movement.
Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and
Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1464, 1491 n.112 (1996).
35
Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/93cons.htm.
Cavanaugh, supra n.1, at 292 (describing this process).
36
See, e.g., Cavanaugh, supra n.1, at 292. These bullet points in South Africa’s democratic transition gloss over the
tremendous difficulties encountered during the process. For a more detailed account, see Richard A. Wilson, THE
POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 63
(Cambridge University Press 2001) (asserting that the most violent and terror-filled period in the apartheid era was
from 1990-1994).
37
Id. at 13; De Lange, supra n.5.
38
Cavanaugh, supra n.1 , at 295-96.
39
Id. (quoting from the Explanatory Memorandum of the South African Constitution).
40
Constitution Act 108 of 1996, Ch. 2, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm. De
Lange, supra n.5 (describing both the constitution and the process of public participation). See also Cavanaugh,
supra n.1 , at 296-97. For analysis of the provision enshrining a constitutional right to water, see Part V-C.
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Water policy reform was a primary focus during the period of transition, as apartheid policies
had left water inequitably distributed, and access to a sanitary water supply was seen as a crucial
precondition to improving standards of living among the millions of impoverished but newly
enfranchised citizens.41 Thus, in 1994, the government issued a development policy paper called
the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which emphasized redistribution of
municipal resources and the provision of basic municipal services to poor black citizens, in order
to redress the historical injustice in municipal service delivery thathad been put in place through
racially-motivated service subsidies during apartheid.42 Under the RDP, water policy was to be
one of the fundamental governmental policies aimed at redressing past imbalances.43
However, the honeymoon of the transition period was short- lived. I n just two years, the
government changed its development policy focus from socially equitable redistribution to
fiscally austere neo-liberal policies aimed at macroeconomic growth, supplanting the RDP in
1996 with a new national development plan called Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR), which purports merely to implement the RDP but fundamentally alters the national
development strategy in fact.44 GEAR espouses an official government policy of free markets
and globalization, including the opening of domestic markets to foreign competition,
privatization of state-owned industries, and restrictions on public spending.45

41

See Alison Tarmann, South Africa's Water Policy Champions Rights of People and Ecosystem, 28(5) POPULATION
TODAY 1 (2000).
42
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26 (describing PARLIAMENT OF THE GOV’T OF S. AFR., WHITE PAPER
ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Notice No. 1954 of 1994, GG vol. 353, no. 16085 (1994), at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/whitepaper/1994/16085.pdf (on file with Author)). The broader development goals
set out in the RDP include providing ‘equal racial access to state resources’ and ‘ensuring the delivering of housing,
water, preventive health care, and education’. Heinz Klug, Five Years On: How Relevant is the Constitution to the
New South Africa?, 26 VERMONT L.R. 803, 818 (2002) (Symposium: The Fifth Anniversary of the South African
Constitution).
43
Khuzwayo, supra n.20, at 20.
44
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26 (citing Growth, Employment and Redistribution: A
Macroeconomic Strategy, Department of Finance, 14 June 1996, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/1996/gear.pdf).
45
See John Pilger, Freedom Next Time, THE GUARDIAN (London), April 11, 1998. See also De Lange, supra n.5.
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Like many other developing countries seeking to attract foreign investment, South Africa
adopted the mantra of ‘fiscal responsibility’,46 and even at the local level, government officials
embraced the policy of cost-recovery in municipal service delivery.47 The standard justification
for focusing on stringent macroeconomic policies in nations with millions of impoverished
citizens who could ostensibly benefit greatly from state assistance is not just that economic
growth will trickle down, but also that the government’s ability to finance structural
improvements in municipal services is dependent on the health of the national economy, which is
in turn dependent on the country’s ability to induce foreign investment.48 South Africa currently
relies on external assistance, and government officials have undoubtedlyexperienced strong
pressure to create an environment conducive to luring investment from both international lending
institutions and the private corporations that influence them.49 Multinational corporate
management owes no allegiance, legally or otherwise, to the welfare of South Africa’s poorest
citizens, and the domestic policy choices they subtly coerce with elusive investment promises in
the arena of municipal service delivery, such as privatization and cost-recovery, are rarely
beneficial to the millions of citizens living in abject poverty.50
46

Klug, supra n.42, at 818.
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26. See Part IV-B for a more thorough discussion of the policy of cost
recovery in water service delivery.
48
See, e.g., Allan, supra n.1, at 419.
49
See JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE: OUR DESPERATE BATTLE OVER WATER IN A WORLD ABOUT TO
RUN OUT 78, 89-90 (Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam 2001) (noting that wealthy and politically influential supporters of
institutions like the World Bank stand to gain from free market policies in the water sector and the commoditization
of water, and asserting that most of the benefits from World Bank water projects flow to multinational corporations
and large local industries, not to water-deprived individual citizens).
50
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-41
(2001) (preeminent corporate legal scholars discussing the global convergence of corporate law toward a standard
shareholder-oriented model)(“[T]here is today a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties
to whom corporate managers should be accountable, resulting from widespread disenchantment with a privileged
role for managers, employees, or the state in corporate affairs. This is not to say that there is agreement that
corporations should be run in the interests of shareholders alone--much less that the law should sanction that result.
All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized and operated to serve the interests of
society as a whole, and that the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do
the interests of any other members of society. The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and
experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate
47
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South Africa’s deficit is nearly the same as that of developed countries, and international
lending institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) laud the country’s adherence to
fiscal austerity, but it is the poorest and least-advantaged citizens who disproportionately pay the
price of economic restructuring.51 The country has not realized significant foreign investment,
but instead has shed hundreds of thousands of jobs, primarily in sectors like agriculture and
textiles, which tend to employ poor, black women.52 A majority of the population still lives
under desperate, “nutritionally compromised” conditions, and according to some reports,
economic inequalities have actually been exacerbated by trade liberalization and globalization.53
As of 1998, 25% of the national budget was being deployed to make interest payments on
international debt that had accrued under the apartheid regime, and critics argue that the gross
economic distortions the country inherited from apartheid cannot be addressed under such
fiscally austere macroeconomic policies, which come with an opportunity cost of not focusing on
basic redistributive efforts on the ground level.54

social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct
terms, only to those interests.”)(emphasis added). For an innovative critique of the deep-seated corporate influence
over not just law and policy, but societal self-image and perceptions, see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003). In the context of the global water sector, pet water policies such as dam construction
have proven lucrative to select groups of corporations and industry but have exacerbated the impoverished
conditions of powerless local residents, and the current corporate legal structure provides no solution for the
devastation these water projects have wrought upon communities, families, and individuals. See, e.g., ROTHFEDER,
supra n.49, at 79-80 (describing forced relocations brought about by World Bank-funded dam construction projects).
51
See Pilger, supra n.45. Black farmers are particularly disadvantaged by trade liberalizatio n policies, as the
elimination of subsidies makes it nearly impossible for them to compete with large, white-owned agribusinesses that
grew fat off of historically generous State support and now hold dominant market positions and have access to
bountiful water infrastructure. While small, black-owned farms now have the de jure right to operate (land
ownership will not be contested), the inability to invest in water delivery infrastructure serves as an impediment to
market entry. See Schreiner, supra n.2, at 177-78.
52
See id. at 173, and Jeter, supra n.2.
53
Pilger, supra n.45. Schreiner, supra n.2, at 173.
54
Pilger, supra n.45. Pilger puts forth some examples of plausible ground-level redistributive efforts, including
micro-financing and government loans to community cooperatives, both of which could cut out middlemen and
banks and spur industrial development in impoverished communities. Id. On an optimistic note, such concepts may
yet materialize, as advocates of more sustainable local economic development strategies predict a sea change,
pointing to the growing official disillusionment with structural adjustment policies that have not borne their
anticipated fruit. See PATRICK BOND, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEBATES IN SOUTH AFRICA (Municipal

13

DRAFT COPY – March 2005

Thus, despite a transition to democracy and the extension of the franchise to all citizens,
relatively little has changed on the ground, in terms of meaningful improvements in the lives of
the country’s poorest citizens. Poverty remains widespread and squatter settlements
commonplace, and in many regions, there is still limited infrastructure and little or no access to
water for household needs and sanitation.55 ‘Grotesque’ power imbalances and sharp
distributions in wealth still exist: 5% of the population controls 80% of the country’s wealth.
Now the dividing line is more along class than race, but as one writer has put it, “economic
apartheid has replaced legal apartheid with exactly the same consequences for exactly the same
people….”56 A South African economist has stated even more poignantly that, “[i]n the hearts
and minds of every black South African, nothing will ever compare to apartheid, [b]ut there is a
very real frustration now that we have only exchanged the savagery of apartheid for the savagery
of an untethered free market.”57
Some commentators suggest that the disjunction between early institutional commitments to
social equity and the subsequent mushroomingof neo-liberal orthodoxy in South African
political culture reflects an ideological shift to the right in the 1990s.58 The leverage that

Services Project Occasional Papers Series No. 6, February 2002), at
http://www.queensu.ca/msp/pages/Project_Publications/Series/PapersNo6.pdf (quoting an address given by
President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki at a conference in San Francisco in May 2000).
55
Pilger, supra n.45; see also Klug, supra n.42, at 803.
56
Id. The country has implemented aggressive affirmative action programs and there are many black faces in the
governing and corporate elite. However, the vast majority of the population is black, extremely poor, and referred to
as the ‘underclass’. See Melanie Samson, Dumping on Women, 11(1) PSI'S FOCUS ON THE PUBLIC SERVICES 19, 1922 (2004), available at http://www.queensu.ca/msp/pages/Project_Publications/Journals/Samson.htm, and Pilger,
supra n.45.
57
Jeter, supra n.2 (quoting Guy Mhone, an economist at Wits University).
58
Id. Another consideration is that the relatively peaceful transition from an oppressive apartheid government to a
constitutional democracy, in which the ruling National Party essentially negotiated itself out of power, necessarily
entailed some compromises in the structure of the electoral and governing processes. The successful proliferation of
free market ideology among the governing elite may be the fruit of these structural compromises. In other words,
while charismatic and even well-intentioned leaders may be at the helm, the power brokers of the transition period,
and those who benefited from their leadership, have not vanished into the proverbial thin air. Rather, these interests
may continue to exert substantial influence over the governing process, and progressive-minded officials likely do
not have carte blanche to enact policies favored by their impoverished constituents. [author’s suppositions]
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corporate coffers wield over politicians may be one of the explanatory factors in this shift,
especially since influential corporate leadership had been pressing to open up the market to the
global economy long before apartheid officially collapsed.59 Critics of the ANC accuse the party
of a willingness to accept power at any price after decades of political repression,60 and they
impugn party leaders for focusing on reconciliation with the powerbrokers of the apartheid
regime and cozying up to big business interests in order to gain entry into the multinational
corporate elite.61 One critic goes a step further to note that the prevailing political rhetoric,
which placed an emphasis on the reallocation of land, water, and other natural resources to the
people, was merely expedient during the decades of struggle for liberation and the early years of
democratic transition.62 Expediency aside, the language of redistribution, sprinkled throughout
early water policy and legislation, has thus far not translated into significant, substantive changes
for the majority of South Africa’s poorest citizens. comeback

IV. TRANSFORMATIONS IN WATER LAW AND POLICY
The newly elected democratic government identified a critical need to expand water access to
the masses in order to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the population, and in
recognition that existing water laws were incapable of permitting such change, passed a series of
statutesthat radically restructured the underlying legal framework for access to water in South
Africa.63 The Water Services Act of 1997 (WSA)64 codified the Constitutional right to access
basic water supply and sanitation, mandating the construction of sufficient pipes to bring piped

59

Pilger, supra n.45.
See, e.g., id. See also n.34(outlining the history of the ANC).
61
Id.
62
See id.
63
See, e.g., O’Keeffe, supra n.9.
64
Water Services Act 108 of 1997, GG vol. 390, no. 18522, of 19 December 1997, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1997/a108-97.pdf [hereinafter WSA].
60
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water within 200 meters of every household.65 The National Water Act of 1998 (NWA),66
widely considered to be one of the world’s most progressive water policies on paper, is the
“principle legal instrument relating to water resources”67 and has fundamentally transformed the
nature of water management.68 The recently adopted National Water Resources Strategy
(NWRS)69 is a legally binding document, required by the NWA,70 which concretizes the
policies, theories, and standards articulated by the NWA and the Water Services Act.71
Among these various instruments, the NWA in particularserves as the enginefor legal
change. The Purpose of the Act reflects the human rights principles embedded in the
Constitution, including “meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations,”
“promoting equitable access to water,” and “redressing the results of past discrimination.”72 The
Act disconnects water rights from land ownership by replacing riparian rights with an
administrative permit system, to be overseen by the reorganized Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (DWAF), the national agency responsible for formulating and implementing water
policy.73 The Act recognizes a single national water right, called the Reserve, which is designed
to satisfy the Constitutional mandate to protect basic human needs and the environment by
setting aside enough water to sustain functioning ecosystems and to provide each person with

65

South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6. Tarmann, supra n.41.
National Water Act 36 of 1998, GG vol. 398, no. 19182, of 26 August 1998, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a36-98.pdf [hereinafter NWA].
67
NWRS, infra n.69 , at 7.
68
Haffajee, supra n.5. De Lange, supra n.5.
69
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, National Water Resources Strategy, First Edition, September 2004,
available at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Default.htm [hereinafter NWRS].
70
NWA, supra n.66 , at ch. 2, pt. 1 (“National water resource strategy”).
71
Id. at 8-9. NWA, supra n.66 , at ch. 2, pt. 1, §§ 6(1)(a)(i) – (ii). See also Hartley, Cabinet Yes to R21bn, supra
n.16 (announcing government’s approval of the NWRS); A Strategy For Water, INSIGHT (South Africa), September
30, 2003; Neil Ford, Water: Africa's Lifeblood, AFRICAN BUSINESS, November 1, 2002.
72
De Lange, supra n.5; CHIKOZHO, supra n.27, at 8 (citing Ch. 1, §§ 2 (b), (c)); and NWA, supra n.66, at ch. 1, §
2(a).
73
See O’Keeffe, supra n.9. See also the DWAF’s departmental website, at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/About.asp.
66
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sufficient water for drinking, food preparation, and personal hygiene,74 which has subsequently
been quantified as a minimum of 25 liters of water per day.75 It also abolishes private ownership
in water, thereby erasing the previous division between private and public waters, and
bequeathing ownership of water on the nation, to be held in custody by the State.76 The Act
recognizes the unity of the hydrological cycle, abandoning the antiquated legal distinction
between surface and ground waters and including all “water resources” within its scope,
including wetlands and estuaries.77
The NWA was widely supported by the ANC’s poor, black African constituency and
opposed by business interests, white farmers, and the outgoing National Party,78 but it
nonetheless contains a series of compromises, which in turn reflect aforementioned tensions
between the divergent goals of equitable redistribution and fiscal austerity. The new legislation
sets an enabling framework for water to contribute to poverty eradication and redress historical
imbalances,79 but it simultaneously creates loopholes that allow the status quo to prevail, and it
facilitates the implementation of neo-liberal financial policies that undermine its explicit social
justice aspirations.80

74

NWA, supra n.66 , at ch. 3, pt. 3 (“The Reserve”).
See Debell, supra n.16. See also O’Keeffe, supra n.9. See also DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY,
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR WATER SERVICES, Annexure 3 (2003), available at
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/Strategic%20Framework%20approved.pdf (on file with Author)
(definition of “basic water supply facility”).
76
NWA, supra n.66, at ch.1, §3(1) (“As the public trustee of the nation's water resources the National Government,
acting through the Minister, must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and
controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons and in accordance with its
constitutional mandate.”); De Lange, supra n.5.
77
See NWA, supra n.66, at § 1(1)(xxvii). See also De Lange, supra n.5; Allan, supra n.1, at 419.
78
See Haffajee, supra n.5.
79
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 174.
80
See NWA, supra n.66, at Preamble and § 3 (Purpose of Act) (laying out explicit social justice aspirations of the
Act). See also 1997 WHITE PAPER, infra n.96, at Preamble, Introduction, Summary of Policy Approaches, and § 2
(“The New South African Context”).
75
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The statute creates a compulsory licensing system, which is a tool specifically designed to
reform inequitable water allocations.81 In essence, all water uses beyond those encompassed by
the Reserve must apply for permits, and water use permits are temporary and subject to review,
readjustment, and revocation, depending on the reasonableness of the use.82 The statute provides
guidance for reviewing permit applications: where applications for a new water use compete
with existing uses, the basis for decision making will be “beneficial use in the public interest”.83
Further, the Act creates a hierarchy of water uses: the first priority is to allocate water to the
Reserve, followed by sufficient water to honor international agreements and make inter-basin
transfers in the national interest, and lastly, remaining water may be distributed by permit, both
to those municipal uses exceeding the minimum quantity necessary to meet the population’s
basic human requirements, and to economic uses, such as water for industry, mining, and
agriculture.84 Proposed water allocations require an opportunity for public comment, and
objectors to preliminary allocation decisions may appeal to a special water tribunal.85
Despite this laudable framework for the equitable redistribution of water usage, the NWA
effectively grandfathers in riparian allocations, as it simply requires existing large-scale water
consumers to register their uses.86 These preexisting uses are subject to review, and, in theory, if
the decision maker chooses to reallocate water, the State will not be required to pay
compensation for reductions in water access, as under the new law, all water uses beyond the
81

NWA, supra n.66, at ch.4, pt. 8 (“Compulsory licences for water use in respect of specific resource”); Schreiner,
supra n.2, at 172.
82
See CHIKOZHO, supra n.27, at 9.
83
Bate, supra n.15, at 238.
84
De Lange, supra n.5.
85
NWRS, supra n.69, at ch.3, pt. 2.
86
NWA, supra n.66, at ch. 4, pt. 3 (“Existing lawful water uses”) (“This Part permits the continuation under certain
conditions of an existing water use derived from a law repealed by this Act. An existing lawful water use, with any
conditions attached, is recognised but may continue only to the extent that it is not limited, prohibited or terminated
by this Act. No licence is required to continue with an existing lawful water use until a responsible authority
requires a person claiming such an entitlement to apply for a licence. If a licence is issued it becomes the source of
authority for the water use. If a licence is not granted the use is no longer permissible.”). See also Hartley, Kasrils
Taps the Space Age, supra n.30.
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Reserve are usufruct and temporal, not personal property.87 However, if, in this permit process, a
water use is depleted to such an extent that the economic viability of the water user’s enterprise
is “severely affected”, the reduction will be compensable as a taking.88
As stated above, one of the chief purposes of the NWA is to provide the general population
with sufficient access to water to satisfy basic human needs. The Purpose of the Act lists eleven
factors that must be taken into account in managing the resource, the first two of which are:
(a) meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations
(b) promoting equitable access to water89
However, despite this unequivocal statutory mandate to expand access, structural flaws in the
Act itselfhinder actual improvements in water access. First, the Act delegates management to
the local level, while failing to simultaneously guarantee sufficient funding for the provision of
water or for infrastructural maintenance and improvements – necessary preconditions to water
service delivery.90 Second, the Act embraces a policy of cost-recovery that, as implemented,
continues to deny the most impoverished South African citizens their Constitutional right to
87

See Schreiner, supra n.2, at 177.
De Lange, supra n.5.
89
NWA, supra n.66, at ch. 1, §§ 2(a)-(b) (emphasis added). In its entirety, the Purpose of the Act states:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the nation's water resources are protected, used,
developed, conserved, managed and controlled in ways which take into account amongst other
factors
(a)
meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations;
(b)
promoting equitable access to water;
(c)
redressing the results of past racial and gender discrimination;
(d)
promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the public
interest;
(e)
facilitating social and economic development;
(f)
providing for growing demand for water use;
(g)
protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their biological diversity;
(h)
reducing and preventing pollution and degradation of water resources;
(i)
meeting international obligations;
(j)
promoting dam safety;
(k)
managing floods and droughts,
and for achieving this purpose, to establish suitable institutions and to ensure that they have
appropriate community, racial and gender representation.
Id.
90
Haffajee, supra n.5. See also NWA, supra n.66, at ch. 5, pt. 2, §§ 61-62.
88
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access a basic quantity of clean water.91 Lastly, the Act paves the way for privatization of the
water services sector, and in South Africa’s geopolitical context, this trend threatens to reinforce
apartheid-era patterns of water service provision.92

A. Decentralized Management and Funding Shortages
The NWA decentralizes water management by establishing a system of newly-created
Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs), which are formed to manage water according to the
natural boundaries of river basins (catchments).93 CMAs, in conjunction with the local water
service authorities established under the WSA,94 jointly decentralize the South African water
sector. Under this new system, the local water service providers do not have unchecked
discretion, as DWAF is empowered to promulgate norms and standards relating to the provision
of water services, which standards must consider “the need for everyone to have a reasonable
quality of life” and “the need for equitable access to water services.”95
91

See NWA, supra n.66, at ch.5, pt.1, §§ 56-60.
There is no explicit discussion of private investment in water services in the NWA, except a minor reference in
§116(c)(iii). However, subsequent policy documents have explicitly embraced privatization. See discussion on
privatization, infra Part IV-C.
93
NWA, supra n.66 , at ch.7 (“Catchment management agencies”); Caroline Kihato & Tobias Schmitz, ENHANCING
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: LESSONS FROM THE WATER SECTOR, 39-40 (Center for Policy Studies, Johannesburg,
2002). See also CHIKOZHO, supra n.27, at 2. The Act doesn’t leave CMAs entirely to their own devices, as it
requires the deployment of some minimum quantity of the national budget toward the operation of CMAs, but it
does not specify how much:
(2) A catchment management agency must be funded by
(a) money appropriated by Parliament;
(b) water use charges; and
(c) money obtained from any other lawful source for the purpose of exercising its powers
and carrying out its duties in terms of this Act.
NWA, supra n.66, at ch. 7, pt. 3, § 84(2).
94
WSA, supra n.64, at ch. III, §§ 11 – 21. The WSA defines “water services authority” as “any municipality,
including a district
or rural council as defined in the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993) responsible for
ensuring access to water services.” Id. at ch. I, § 1(xx)
95
WSA, supra n.64, at §§ 9, 10. The DWAF did in fact promulgate compulsory national standards relating to
tariffs, with which every water service institution is required to comply in its pricing scheme. DEP’T OF WATER
AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, NORMS AND STANDARDS IN RESPECT OF TARIFFS FOR WATER SERVICES IN TERMS OF
SECTION 10 (1) OF THE WATER SERVICES ACT (ACT NO. 108 OF 1997) (2001), available at
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Notices/Water%20Services%20Act/SEC10(1)REGS11%20JUNE%202001.doc (on file with Author).
92
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Devolved water management authority appears to be a remedy tailored specifically to
counteract South Africa’s experience with natural resource management under apartheid
governance, as it is purportedly designed to avoid the pitfalls of autocratic centralized control
over a local resource and to promote widespread local participation in the decision-making
process.96 However, achieving equitable participation in local resource management is
complicated by the “skewed structure of South African society,” which is in large part a
byproduct of apartheid.97 The National Party strategically entrenched the power of traditional
leaders, in order to control decision making in rural areas, and traditional law evolved under
apartheid to prevent ordinary citizens from participating in development issues.98 These customs
continue to inhibit full participation. Thus, for example, in some rural areas, women are
prohibited from expressing their views in the presence of a chief. 99 In South Africa’s maledominated society, calls for full participation challenge gender norms in the household and in the
community – women are responsible for family chores (such as fetching water on a daily basis)
as well as gainful employment (where possible), and those women who do have enough free time

96

See DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL WATER POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA,
§§ 7.1, 7.1.3 (1997), at http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpwp.pdf (on file with Author) [hereinafter
1997 WHITE PAPER]; see also South Africa: The Water Services Act, supra n.6. See generally Bate, supra n.15
(documenting at length the problems associated with apartheid-era centralized control over water resources).
97
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 174. As some scholars have observed,
“[T]he fact that the establishment of [devolved authority to new, local institutions] did not occur
simultaneously with reform of entitlements to water has meant that catchment management is still
concerned predominantly with ‘green’ rather than ‘brown’ environmental issues. As a result,
concern with the role and participation of poorer communities in these institutions persists, and the
only real participation from poorer communities appears to be in those areas in which access to the
resource has been enhanced or was a historical fact…[P]lacing catchment management before
water reform raises interesting questions about participation: to what extent are there incentives
for those who have no access to water to participate in institutions that are to manage the resource?
…[W]ithout a real stake in decision-making (…through direct entitlements to water), the turnout
for public meetings on water resource management may remain restricted to those who have
historically enjoyed access to the resource.”
Kihato, supra n.93, at 56, 59.
98
Khuzwayo, supra n.20, at 21.
99
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 176.
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to attend catchment forums tend to observe passively.100 Thus, the mere presence of women at
such forums is not an indication of their involvement in decision-making processes.101
Poor, black communities were historically excluded from local water management, and this
puts them at a strategic disadvantage in terms of the capacity to make informed decisions.102
Overcoming this gap in information and experience requires training (“the process of transferring
specific functional skills and knowledge to bring a person to an agreed standard of proficiency”)
as well as capacity-building (strengthening the institutional ability to undertake tasks, mobilizing
communities, and creating community-wide awareness).103 The objectives driving concerted
efforts to train and build capacity are both to expand participatory local decision making as well
as to enable communities to take ownership of water schemes, under the theory that this is the
best way to guarantee their ongoing success.104 Training members of impoverished South
African communities in the relevant aspects of water management105 is a formidable task,
because of widespread illiteracy, language barriers,106 and a limited familiarity with
technology.107 Certainly, progressive steps have been taken to overcome obstacles to

100

Id. at 174. See also 1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96, at § 7.3.3 (“Women are the traditional custodians of natural
resources in the rural areas, and they are also the people who suffer most from degradation of water and other
natural resources. In the rural areas women spend long hours fetching water for their families, and are the custodians
of family health.”).
101
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 174.
102
See id.
103
G. Schoeman & P. Pybus, The Role of Communication in the Delivery of Water Services to Communities, 2(4)
WATER SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY: WATER SUPPLY 225, 231 (2002).
104
See Schoeman, supra n.103, at 233.
105
Such relevant aspects of water management include, but are not limited to, mechanics, operations, and
maintenance. Id. at 233.
106
The South African constitution formally recognizes 11 official languages: Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati,
Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 1, § 6(1), available
at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons1.htm. However, this list is not exclusive of all
languages spoken within the country. See id. at § 6(5) (making provision for other languages spoken in the country,
including Koi, Nama, San, sign language, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu, Urdu, Arabic,
Hebrew and Sanskrit).
107
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 176; Schoeman, supra n.103, at 232. The lack of familiarity with technology is partially
attributable to apartheid policy that deliberately denied black citizens access to education in math and science, but it
is exacerbated by ongoing economic disparities. Tarmann, supra n.41. As Schreiner poignantly notes, a ‘digital
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participation, such as the creation of “forum champions” – individuals strategically selected and
trained to administer forums, resolve conflict, and communicate with the other members of the
community – and the coordination of water management schemes with other community-based
local economic development initiatives.108 However, these measures neither eliminate nor fully
compensate for the numerous economic and cultural obstacles to substantive participation by a
truly representative slice of local populations. This is troubling, because enhanced democratic
local control is provided as one of the primary justifications for delegation of responsibility to
local institutions.109
Meanwhile, the national government has steadily decreased its funding to local governments
(funding was reduced by 85% during the period 1991-98 and an additional 55% from 19972000) and simultaneously burdened those same localities with the responsibility to provide water
to their residents.110 Thus, whatever the intentions behind decentralized management, it may not
amount to much more than an artful legislative copout by the national government, because so
many communities have neither the capacity to manage water democratically nor the finances to
supply it affordably. Delegation does, however, facilitate the more neoliberal aspects of the
government’s agenda, including cost recovery and privatization.

divide’ separates those with access to the latest communications technology from those who don’t even have
electricity. Schreiner, supra n.2, at 174.
108
Schreiner, supra n.2, at 175; Schoeman, supra n.103, at 233.
109
See NWA, supra n.66, at Preamble (“Recognising the need for the integrated management of all aspects of water
resources and, where appropriate, the delegation of management functions to a regional or catchment level so as to
enable everyone to participate”). In fact, one scholar notes that “‘[e]mpowerment’ and ‘community participation’
are buzz words[] that end up becoming hollow clichés as they sometimes completely miss the point…Rural
communities [are] being used as pawns in the new political game…It is doubtful whether rural communities really
understand the extent to which they are being used.” Khuzwayo, supra n.20, at 20.
110
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26 (also asserting that at the local level, a grossly disproportionate
amount of human resources, capital infrastructure, and financial resources continue flow to and benefit wealthier
communities, not the impoverished settlements). But cf. Part V-C-2 (outlining the potential increases in national
funding to local governments post-2000 through the local government equitable share).
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B. Cost Recovery
Post-apartheid South Africa inherited a legacy of historically subsidized water provision, and
from the outset, the new government embraced the principle of cost recovery in the water
sector.111 This policy attaches a price tag to water usage,112 which is designed to reflect the true
societal cost of consuming a finite resource and finance the cost of managing and delivering the
resource to end users.113 Cost recovery stems from the conception of water as an economic
resource,114 which view is promoted by the World Bank and reflects the underlying principle that
“water should be made available to people only if the company providing it can recover its costs
plus a profit…and those who can't pay are not to get services.”115 Proponents of cost recovery in
service provision place a premium on economic efficiency,116 although the language in South
Africa’s policy documents and legislation on the topic of cost recovery in the water sector never
ceases to emphasize the importance of countervailing equity considerations.117 Large, licensed

111

See David A. McDonald, The Theory and Practice of Cost Recovery, in COST RECOVERY AND THE CRISIS OF
SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 17, 20-22 (David A. McDonald & John Pape eds., Human Sciences Research
Council 2002).
112
1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96, at § 6.5.3 (“To achieve the objectives of water management…all significant
water resource use will be charged for, regardless of where it occurs…The only exception will be in respect of the
Reserve for basic human needs.”).
113
NWA, supra n.66, at ch.5, pt.1 (“Water use charges are to be used to fund the direct and related costs of water
resource management, development and use, and may also be used to achieve an equitable and efficient allocation of
water. In addition, they may also be used to ensure compliance with prescribed standards and water management
practices according to the user pays and polluter pays principles. Water use charges will be used as a means of
encouraging reduction in waste, and provision is made for incentives for effective and efficient water use.”).
114
1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96, at § 6.5 (“What is at issue is the way water is valued as an economic resource,
the costs incurred to make the resource available to users and the methods used to cover those costs. In pursuit of the
objectives of water management, it is widely agreed that the setting of the appropriate price for a natural resource
such as water can be an effective mechanism to achieve its efficient and productive use.”) (emphasis added).
115
Heidi Vogt, Environmental Justice in South Africa: Water Sanitation, Privatization, and the Legacy of Apartheid,
246 DOLLARS & SENSE 8 (March 1, 2003).
116
See, e.g., 1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96 , at § 6.5.
117
See 1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96, at § 6.5.2 (“It is important that the introduction of realistic pricing for water
does not further penalize disadvantaged communities who were already penalised during the apartheid era. White
communities were given a strong economic advantage under apartheid through access to
cheap water, while economic development in black communities was restricted by a variety of factors, one of which
was lack of access to affordable water. In the interests of equity and social justice, this aspect will have to be
considered in the question of water pricing. The price to be levied for water reserved to meet basic needs must merit
particular attention.”). See also NWRS, supra n.69, at ch.3,p t. 4, §3.4.1.1 (“The objective of the pricing strategy is
to contribute to achieving equity and sustainability in water matters by promoting financial sustainability and
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water uses are governed by the NWA, which establishes a pricing framework and liability for
nonpayment and makes provision for water use restrictions and cutoffs as a remedy.118 The
water pricing for domestic use, on the other hand, is governed by the WSA, which articulates a
duty on the part of a water service authority to provide consumers in its jurisdiction with
affordable access to water services, and a duty on the part of consumers to pay reasonable
charges for their water use.119
Insufficient access to potable water was a widespread problem before the ANC came into
power, but to the extent that water was available, it was provided for free or at a highlysubsidized price.120 When the government introduced cost recovery, the price of water increased
dramatically, and the connection fees and volumetric charges proved too expensive for
struggling, low-income households who had previously accessed water from communal taps.121
As a result, many individuals were forced to resort to collecting water from streams, canals, and
stagnant puddles:
[Metolina Mthembu, a 70-year-old resident of Mbabe village in the KwaZulu-Natal province, is]
glad the new government installed a tap outside her home two years ago. But now the water costs
money, she notes, and people here are poor. “There are no jobs. We must choose between food
and water, so we buy food and pray that the water does not make us ill. It is a bad gamble. Many,
many of us have grown sick from the water.”122

economic efficiency in water use. One objective is to ensure that the real financial costs of managing water
resources and supplying water, including the cost of capital, are recovered from users. Provisions are, however,
made for a range of subsidies for water users from historically disadvantaged groups to promote equitable access to
the use of water resources.”).
118
NWA, supra n.66, at ch.5, pt.1 (“Non payment of water use charges will attract penalties, including the possible
restriction or suspension of water supply from a waterwork or of an authorisation to use water.”) (emphasis added);
id. at §§ 57(4), 59(2), and 59(3)(b).
119
WSA, supra n.64 , at ch. III, §§ 11(1), 11(2)(d) (qualifying that such charges must be set in accordance with “any
prescribed norms and standards for tariffs for water services”).
120
Jeter, supra n.2; McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
121
Jeter, supra n.2; Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, Water Shortage Will Reach Crisis Levels Globally By 2025,
BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), August 19, 2002.
122
Jeter, supra n.2.
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Charges for water service delivery have led to substantial debt among low-income families,
which according to one national survey, averaged US$290 by 2001.123 Another case study found
payments in arrears that ranged from US$500 to US$1500,124 and a third found households with
debt as high as US$3800, when combined with payments in arrears for electricity service
provision.125 Service providers are required to make arrangements with struggling households to
help them manage their payments,126 but experience has demonstrated that many of these
payment arrangements are structured such that the families will remain perpetually in debt.127
Providers are also required to establish a policy for indigents,128 but in many regions, this policy
is either nonexistent or insufficient. For example, in one locality, the measuring stick of a
household’s indigent status is its water consumption, not its ability to pay, so ifthe household
consumes more than 20 kiloliters per month, it will not be eligible for indigent assistance.129
Ratepayers who are unable to make their payments risk having their houses taken from them and
sold, and tenants of local public housing risk eviction.130 Thus, for those living on the margins of
South African society, the stakes of consuming more water than one can afford are very high.

123

The survey was conducted in July 2001 by the Human Sciences Research Council, with a sample size of 2430
respondents. McDonald, The Bell Tolls for Thee, supra n.6, at 168. The debt figure provided was R$2,274, which
the author converted to US dollars at the interbank rate on January 15, 2001, courtesy of Oanda.com, available at
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.
124
Hameda Deedat, Viva Prepaids, Viva! Assessing New Technology for Cost Recovery in the Rural Northern Cape,
in COST RECOVERY AND THE CRISIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 143, 154 (David A. McDonald & John
Pape eds., Human Rights Research Council 2002). The range of debt figures provided was R$4000 – R$12,000,
which the author converted to US dollars at the interbank rate on January 15, 2001, courtesy of Oanda.com,
available at http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.
125
McDonald, The Bell Tolls for Thee, supra n.6, at 168. The debt figure provided was R$30,000, which the author
converted to US dollars at the interbank rate on January 15, 2001, courtesy of Oanda.com, available at
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic.
126
See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 4.5.8 (bullet paragraph entitled “Compassion”).
127
See Mthetho Xali, “They are Killing us Alive” A Case Study of the Impact of Cost Recovery on Service Provision
in Makhaza Section, Khayelitsha, in COST RECOVERY AND THE CRISIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN SOUTH AFRICA 101,
113 (David A. McDonald & John Pape eds., Human Rights Research Council 2002).
128
See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 4.5.8 (bullet paragraph entitled “Compassion”).
129
Id. at 106.
130
Id. at 101. A 2001 survey and report conducted jointly by an NGO and a government agency indicated that 2
million people had been evicted from their homes for failure to pay for their water and electricity bills. Anthony
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Surprisingly, a debate actually exists among academics and government officials as to the
reason behind widespread nonpayment for water service delivery. Some policymakers claim this
phenomenon is a residual effect of a “culture of nonpayment” that developed during the
liberation movement’s boycotts of the apartheid regime.131 This argument ultimately pins
culpability on impoverished citizens for their inability to pay for cleanwater and turns a blind
eye to both the current economic realities among poor communities and the underlying politicolegal structure. Ample evidence put forth by NGOs and university researchers demonstrates that
many families, especially in rural areas with staggering levels ofunemployment , are simply
unable to cope with the financial burden of paying water bills.132 The disturbing implication of
the existence of this debate is that officials who subscribe to the “culture of nonpayment” theory
feel justified in limiting or denying access to water based on ability to pay.133
Water service cutoffs are the most common response to a household or a community’s
inability to pay, and since cost recovery was introduced in 1996, more than 10 million people
have had their water disconnected, with a disputed 700,000 persons cut off from water supply in

Stoppard, Economy – South Africa: Water, Electric Cutoffs Affect 10 Million, INTER PRESS SERVICE, March 21,
2002.
131
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26, at 16.
“Many government officials and business executives also argue that a national habit dating back
to the apartheid era--when entire communities boycotted white rule by refusing to pay rent and
utilities--is responsible for many of the cutoffs. ‘You will find in South Africa there exists a
culture of nonpayment,’ says Jacob Maroga, managing director of distribution for ESKOM, the
electric utility that the state is preparing to sell. ‘There are people who have very legitimate
reasons for not paying their bills, but there are many more who grew accustomed through our
liberation movement to simply not paying a bill. That's not the kind of attitude that's constructive
to building a modern, productive economy.’”
Jeter, supra n.2.
132
Jeter, supra n.2; Xali, supra n.127, at 106, 113; McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
Most low-income households keep careful records of their service bills, know exactly how much
they owe and are deeply concerned about how they are going to pay their current bills and arrears.
‘People take their payments seriously, they have statements on file going back several years. This
is not the behavior of someone who does not care about paying for their services,’ explains
Municipal Services Project co-director, David McDonald.
Stoppard, supra n.130.
133
This is evidenced by municipalities that are rather insensitively advising residents to ‘use less water’ as a solution
to their financial woes. Xali, supra n.127, at 112.
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2001 alone.134 Many local governments have also begun installing prepaid meters, which are
purportedly designed to help households monitor their water use and avoid incurring debt, but
more importantly, they eliminate the problems associated with issuing and collecting bills from
poor residents by ensuring that people pay for water before they use it.135
Potable water is necessary for drinking and also for cooking, since cheap staple foods like
pap, mealie-meal, and samp require lengthy boiling to make them edible for human
consumption.136 Desperate people whose water supply is cut off are put in the undignified
position of asking their neighbors for water or even stealing it, to the detriment of the social
fabric of low-income communities.137 Demonstrations and riots have ensued in protest to service
cutoffs,138 and some communities have even organized teams of bootleg plumbers to reconnect
water supplies.139 In some localities, water service providers have resorted to tearing up service
delivery infrastructure, which is counterproductive to the national government’s aspirations to
expand access, and armed guards are deployed to fend off protestors while water service is
disconnected.140

134

Ginger Thompson, Water Tap Often Shut to South Africa Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003 (Section A, Column
3); Vogt, supra n.115. The 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services provides that water service providers have
the right to disconnect water services that are provided to domestic water consumers, but only as a last resort, after
the service provider has followed all the necessary procedures, including compassion, communication, fair process,
warning, and restrictions (as opposed to disconnections) in the first instance. See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra
n.75, at § 4.5.8.
135
Xali, supra n.127, at 112; Vogt, supra n.115.
136
Xali, supra n.127, at 107.
137
Deedat, supra n.124, at 150 (quotes from community members on the problem of water theft and community
conflicts over water).
138
See, e.g., Sizwe samaYende, South Africa: Violence Erupts After Water Supplies Cut in Volksrust, AFR. EYE
NEWS SERV., April 20, 1999 (discussing the reaction of citizens in a township located in Mpumalanga to service
cutoffs, which came about after the water system’s meter-reading was temporarily privatized and the citizens
disputed the size of their bills and refused to pay them).
139
Thompson, supra n.134. The “struggle plumber” is the new hero for neighborhoods who are “fighting for access
in the face of multinational corporations’ increasing control of water supply”. They dismantle prepaid meters and
“[hack] into company pipe lines in the name of the right to water.” Vogt, supra n.115. As Professor Dean Rivkin
noted with some irony, struggle plumbers may have achieved more justice in South Africa than all the preceding
legal water reformations combined. Professor Dean Rivkin, Class Discussion in Environmental Justice and
Community Lawyering at Harvard Law School (Dec. 3, 2004).
140
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
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Law-abiding households cut off from potable water supplies are forced to turn to natural
sources for their drinking, cleaning, and bathing, and these sources are often polluted and
unsanitary. In 2000-01, a massive cholera outbreak swept the nation, infecting more than
100,000 people and killing over 200, and this epidemic was directly linked to cost recovery
policy and water service cutoffs,141 as the following passage illustrates:
The afternoon's end brings a rural rush hour of women walking down the dirt road that winds
through this village. Many of them barefoot and dressed in rags, the mothers and grandmothers
come pushing wheelbarrows or carrying big buckets to fetch water for their families. But the road
quickly becomes a divide between the haves and have-nots. Those with pennies to spend stand in
line on one side and buy their water from a metered tap. The larger group scoops water from a
giant, littered mud puddle across the way. Sewage seeps in from leaky pipes nearby. Some of the
women said that cholera had stricken their families. Workers at a mobile clinic have reported high
rates of diarrhea among children here.142

Numerous commentators assert that cost recovery policy thus far has operated at a net economic
loss: the administration of the policy – performing service cutoffs and meter installations and
hiring collections agencies and lawyers – incurs more expenses than it manages to squeeze out of
low-income people, and the cost of coping with water-borne illnesses, in terms of direct medical
expenses and lost economic production, has exceeded the estimated total cost of providing water
infrastructure to every person in the country.143 These figures do not account for the intangible
cost of lost human life, and an estimated 43,000 persons die each year from diarrheal causes,
mostly poor black children under the age of five.144
Service cutoffs and the impacts of cost recovery are concentrated among historically
disadvantaged citizens. During the decades of apartheid, labor flowing from these selfsame
141

Id.

‘No one doubts our government's good intentions,’ says David Hemson, research director of the
government-funded Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). ‘But in the name of
development, in the name of progress and modernization, we have exposed our most vulnerable
populations to this very colonial disease, a disease that is by definition a by-product of
backwardness. What does that say about policies like cost recovery?’
Jeter, supra n.2 (emphasis added).
142
Thompson, supra n.134.
143
Xali, supra n.127, at 113, 116; McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26; Khan, supra n.5 ; Jeter, supra n.2.
144
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
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communities subsidized infrastructure to deliver water to white suburbs and white-owned
industries, and as a result, service levels in wealthy and industrial areas now equal or surpass
North American standards.145 Thus, the imposition of cost recovery policy, combined with
decentralized management of water resources and service distribution, seems patently unjust for
impoverished localities that must simultaneously address poverty and water scarcity, all while
financing the construction of water infrastructure to deliver water services without a sizeable
industrial or suburban tax base.146

C. Privatization
Equity aside, decentralization and cost recovery lay the groundwork for privatization of the
water service sector. Local governments are trying to turn water services into profitable ventures
in order to attract private investors,147 and this fits squarely within the national policy position.
As discussed in Part III, international lenders like the IMF and the World Bank have encouraged
the South African government to adopt conservative fiscal measures such as cost recovery
(making the dispensation of public services like water pay for itself through fees) and
privatization (relinquishing state-owned water operations to private companies). This pressure
has been tremendously influential, as is evidenced by the most recent national articulation of
water policy: “While privatisation is an emotional and very much political issue in South Africa,
the private sector has played and will continue to play an important role in water services. The
challenges facing us are simply too big to be addressed by government alone.”148 Private sector

145

See id.
See, e.g., V.J. Bath, The How, Why and What of Managing Water Supply During the Period of South Africa's
Political Rebirth, 14(1) WATER SUPPLY 101, 106 (1996) (predicting the difficulty of financing water services and
water supply in districts that do not contain large water consumers to help foot the bill of district-wide service
delivery).
147
Jeter, supra n.2; Thompson, supra n.134.
148
See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at 19, § 3.4.7 (quoting Minister Kasrils, address to the African
Investment Forum, April 2003).
146
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involvement in local water service constitutes one of the ten “key principles informing the
institutional vision” laid out by the 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services, which is the
most recent national policy document for the water services sector.149
Proponents of privatization argue that private companies have greater capacity to efficiently
deliver water, and they note that state-run water services have failed to bring clean water and
sanitation to millions of people in the preceding decades, and that, as a factual matter,
international donors and lenders require some element of privatization as a precondition for
funding.150 Pro-privatization interests are clearly winning the battle, as they have the support of
both national and local policymakers. Since 1999, several local governments have entered longterm water service contracts with international conglomerates, including Nelspruit,
Johannesburg, and Cape Town.151
Critics of privatization express concern that private companies’ single-minded attention to
the bottom line will lead to anti- labor measures, such as layoffs, wage cuts, union-busting
activities, and cutting corners on health and safety measures.152 They also point out that

149

Id. at §§ 1.3, 3.1.
Ford, supra n.71; Vogt, supra n.115.
151
South Africa: First Water Services Privatization Contract Awarded, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Friday,
January 29, 1999 (text of report by the South African news agency SAPA); Johnson, supra n.8; Dumisane Lubisi,
South Africa: Nelspruit's Privatised Water Deal Signed, AFR. EYE NEWS SERV., April 21, 1999; Thompson, supra
n.134; Wyndham Hartley, Project Will Secure Cape Town's Future Water Supply, BUSINESS DAY (South Africa),
September 27, 2004.
152
It is important to keep in mind that those individuals constituting the labor class, who are detrimentally affected
by anti-worker measures, are also the members of impoverished communities in need of water service extension.
See Johnson, supra n.8. Labor unions have been the most vocal and organized opponents of privatization. See, e.g.,
Kihato, supra n.93 (discussing the framework agreement struck between the government and the Congress of South
African Trade Unions, called the Framework of the Restructuring of Municipal Service Provision). In the face of
onslaughts against service delivery, the municipal workers’ union (SAMWU) held a workshop that was designed to
focus on restructuring public service delivery as an alternative to privatization. From the perspectives of
environmental justice and community advocacy, as well as public relations, this was an interesting effort to channel
participants’ energy toward proactive, positive, and creative efforts, rather than reactive, combative, and negative
strategies like litigation. At this workshop, participants engaged in role play to come up with creative methods for
restructuring the public work force to make it more effective and thereby protect it from being eliminated and
outsourced or privatized altogether. John Pape, Public Sector Alternative: SAMWU’s Efforts, 25(4) SOUTH AFRICAN
LABOUR BULLETIN 45 (2001). Unions are also concerned with the gendered implications of privatization. For
example, the municipal workers’ union and an NGO called the Municipal Services Project jointly conducted the
150
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privatization is limited as an option to those regions of the country with a sufficiently wealthy
water consumer base to attract private investment, and that rural areas are not well situated to
leverage such funds.153 There is additional concern that even within a given region, a private
service provider may have an incentive to focus on providing water to wealthier areas, where
marginal returns are higher, at the expense of building the infrastructure necessary to extend
access to poorer communities.154 This phenomenon, combined with the long-term nature of
contracts entered thus far, may serve to reinforce apartheid-era service delivery, since many
townships and peri-urban areas still have not been incorporated into the wealthy, white-washed
cities they enfold and therefore risk exclusion from the benefits of privatization.155 In fact,
opponents of privatization marshal the vivid language of historical oppression in their
critiques,156 and it is noted that “[t]he issue of access to services has become an explosive new
cause in the same urban townships and rural squatter camps that were principal battlegrounds for
the fight against apartheid.”157

V. ANALYZING THE RIGHT TO WATER
A. Water as a Human Right
Opponents of cost recovery and privatization define the provision of water as a
quintessentially public service, and from this presumption flowsthe conviction that water should
be provided by a democratic government in accordance with the public interest, rather than by a
Gender and Local Government Restructuring Research and Capacity Building Project, the results of which
supported previous international research findings. The study indicated that structural adjustment and privatization
negatively affect workers, and specifically negatively affect female workers more than male workers due to
gendered divisions of labor in the workplace. Samson, supra n.56.
153
Kihato, supra n.93.
154
Johnson, supra n.8.
155
Lubisi, supra n.151 .
156
“‘Privatization is a new kind of apartheid,’ said Richard Makolo, leader of the Crisis Water Committee, which
was formed to resist the privatization effort in a township called Orange Farm, 25 miles south of Johannesburg.
‘Apartheid separated whites from blacks. Privatization separates the rich from the poor.’” Thompson, supra n.134.
157
Id.
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profit-seeking entity, private or public, that arguably responds to market imperatives rather than
community imperatives.158 As one scholar reflects,
For with the acceptance of water as a commodity comes the dilemma of what to do with the idea
of water as a basic human right. In other words, if we are willing to use monetary value as our sole
guiding principle for water extraction, treatment and distribution, on what grounds do we make
moral decisions about how much water is enough and who is consuming too much? Just because
someone can afford to pay the cost of filling their swimming pool or washing their cars every day,
should they have the right to do so when others are struggling to survive with no water at all?159

The global debate on whether water is an economic resource or a public good that eludes
commodification is a longstanding one and exceeds the scope of this paper.160 However, to the
extent that there is an emphasis on the public interest in water provision and inherent rights of
access in South Africa, this stems from a conception of water as a human right. It is useful to
explore the right to water from a human rights perspective, because, structural adjustment
policies notwithstanding, the South African Constitution incorporates human rights principles in
its Bill of Rights, and these principles infuse allsubsequent nat ional water laws and policies.161
International human rights are individual rights that are enforceable against State
governments, as compared to abstract morals or standards thatcarry no legal weight. For the
purposes of this discussion, human rights are limited to “genuine rights under international law,
where States have a duty to protect and promote those rights for an individual.”162 Within this
rubric, the South African Constitutional provision on water reflects human rights principles,

158

Johnson, supra n.8. CHIKOZHO, supra n.27, at 6 (“[O]ne has to bear in mind that water is a basic human need
and therefore, its allocation has to be carried out taking into consideration some social imperatives. The need for
emphasising the user pays principle and cost recovery has to be delicately balanced with the users’ ability to pay lest
others will be deprived of this basic need.”)
159
McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26.
160
In fact, this debate was a central topic at the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin in
1992, which resulted in guiding principle #4: “'Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good.” The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, at
http://www.wmo.ch/web/homs/documents/english/icwedece.html. Despite the adoption of this principle in the
Dublin conference, the classification of water as a commodity is far from settled practice. See, e.g., ROTHFEDER,
supra n.49, at 77-97 (chapter analyzing the international political debates of the last fifteen years over whether water
is best characterized as a legal right or a non-guaranteed need).
161
De Lange, supra n.5.
162
Peter H. Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POLICY 487, 488 (1998) (on file with author).
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because it places a duty on the South African government to protect and promote the right to
water for all individuals.163 In fact, scholars advocating the international recognition of a human
right to water point to Section 27 of the South African Constitution to lend support for their
argument.164
The two major sources of international law are treaties (conventions or covenants, in the
parlance of international legalese) and customary international law, which develops over time in
recognition of widely-agreed-upon morals and norms of conduct.165 Among the various binding
agreements and sources of customary law, there is no explicit human right to water,166 but
several international legal scholars argue persuasively that a right to water can be inferred from
the basic instruments of international human rights law.167 These scholars find support for an
inferred right to water from the following explicit human rights:

163

S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 27, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm. But
compare Ron C. Slye, Economic and Social Rights – South Africa – Role of International Standards in Interpreting
and Implementing Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 669, 678-79 (2003) (asserting that the
socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution depart from international human rights, as envisioned by the
ICESCR committee, in that those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are group rights, not individual rights: the
state’s positive obligations apply to groups, and there are no individual entitlements to specific resources) with
Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African
Constitutional Court, 20(2) SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 284, 296-97 (2004), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sajhr/2004/wesson.pdf (observing that a recent decision by the South African
Constitutional Court appears to extend individual rights to members of a particular group, but only with respect to a
resource that has limited cost implications and requires no necessary expertise to administer, and speculating that
with respect to matters with ‘far-reaching financial implications’ or that ‘involve significant expertise’, the Court
will recognize only the more generalized group right to reasonable governmental plan, policy, or program).
164
Both Peter Gleick and Ignacio Alvarez refer to § 27(1)(b) of the South African constitution as evidence of “State
practice” treating water as a human right. Gleick, supra n.162, at 493; Ignacio J. Alvarez, The Right to Water as a
Human Right, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 76 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge D. Taillant eds.,
2003). State practice is an important element of the process in which customary international law develops over
time. See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 72, 72 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2nd ed., 2000).
165
See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra n.164, at 72-78.
166
The one exception is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Alvarez, supra n.164, at 7475. In fact, there is even a longstanding debate concerning the existence of an explicit human right to a healthy
environment, of which water is only a component, albeit a crucial one. See, e.g., Timothy J. Schorn, Drinkable
Water and Breathable Air: A Livable Environment as a Human Right, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 121, 122
137-39 (2000) (citing W. PAUL GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION (1976)).
167
Gleick, supra n.162; Alvarez, supra n.164, at 71; Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and
International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1992). But cf. ROTHFEDER, supra n.49, at 78 (observing
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•

•
•

The inherent right to life, including rights to an appropriate means of
subsistence and the right to a decent standard of living [found in Article 6 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)]168
The right to health[found in Article 12 of the ICESCR] 169
The right to food [found in Article 11 of the ICESCR]170

Water is a precondition to these rights, because survival, an adequate standard of living, good
health, and potentially, sufficient food, all depend on a minimum amount of clean water to
prevent dehydration, reduce the risk of water-borne diseases, and provide for cooking, hygiene,
and sanitation.171
The lingering question remains, though, thatif water is inextricably linked to other cherished
and legally protected rights, why was it not included in human rights documents? Peter Gleick’s
answer is that, at its genesis, the field of international human rights focused on recognizing and
protecting libertarian individual rights to freedom from violence and oppression by the State. He
observes that the field evolved over time to encompass the recognition and protection of
standards and morals associated with general human wellbeing, and subsequent treaties reflected
this progression.172 However, he contends that at the time of their drafting in the 1950s and 60s,
the framers of these relatively ‘modern’ treaties did not foresee that water scarcity and water
access would be problematic on such a global scale, but instead considered water to be a

that at recent global environmental summits, which are dominated by wealthy power players, the current consensus
is that water is not a right, only a need). The political conclusions drawn at these summits, however, do not
necessarily eviscerate scholarly conclusions to the contrary.
168
Gleick, supra n.162, at 492, and Alvarez, supra n.164, at 73-74.
169
Gleick, supra n.162, at 492, and Alvarez, supra n.164, at 73.
170
Gleick, supra n.162, at 492, and Alvarez, supra n.164, at 73. Alvarez contends that water is necessary to realize
a right to food, but acknowledges that water’s status with respect to food is not totally clear. Id. at 76. Gleick, on
the other hand, does not think that water can be inferred from the right to food, because food can be imported.
Gleick, supra n.162 , at 491.
171
See Gleick, supra n.162, at 491.
172
Gleick, supra n.162, at 488.
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resource as fundamental and plentiful as air.173 Thus, in his view, the omission of an explicit
right to clean water in basic international human rights documents is attributable to a lack of
foresight, rather than an intentional exclusion.174
Establishing a human right to water will not, in and of itself, guarantee the ultimate
satisfaction of worldwide water needs.175 Rather, the value of acknowledging a human right to
water in international jurisprudence is that such recognition will encourage both the international
community and domestic governments to a) translate that right into specific legal obligations and
responsibilities [which South Africa has already done], b) renew their efforts to meet the basic
water needs of their populations [which South Africa is in the process of doing], and c)
financially prioritize meeting basic water requirements over other investment and management
decisions [which South Africa only recently claims to be doing].176

B. South Africa’s Free Basic Water Policy
In 2001, South Africa formally adopted a policy of Free Basic Water (FBW), which aims to
provide each household with 6,000 liters of clean water every month free of charge – the
minimum quantity of water identified by the government as necessary for survival.177
Purportedly, the FBW policy was announced shortly after the Minister of Water Affairs, Ronnie
173

This makes more sense when considered in light of the fact that the world’s population is exploding, while the
world water supply has remained fixed for the last 3 million years. Thus, water scarcity is increasing (water scarcity
being defined as the amount of water available relative to the number of human beings vying for access to the
resource), and a global water crisis is more widely recognized in 2005 than it was fifty years ago. See, e.g., Alvarez,
supra n.164, at 71.
174
Gleick, supra n.162, at 490, 501. As he rather passionately asserts, “To assume the contrary would mean that
there is no right to the single most important resource necessary to satisfy the human rights more explicitly
guaranteed by the world’s primary human rights declarations and covenants.” Id. at 493.
175
As Gleick points out, a human right to food unequivocally exists, and yet nearly a billion people in the world
remain undernourished. Id. at 489.
176
Gleick, supra n.162, at 489. Cf. ROTHFEDER, supra n.49 , at 78 (“The question of right versus need isn’t a tiny
semantic distinction or an intellectual argument with little significance in real life. The day-to-day living conditions
endured by millions of people – and for some, their survival – as well as the growing gap between water haves and
haven-nots, are directly tied to the outcome of the debate over whether water is a right or a need. Moreover, global
water management policies…are being crafted and funded based on its conclusions.”).
177
Saving Water, supra n.8.
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Kasrils, observed a woman in the Eastern Cape collecting water from a dirty stream despite
water pipes having recently been installed in her village by DWAF, and upon inquiry, learned
that she was not using piped water because she couldn’t afford it.178 This incident happened to
coincide with the cholera epidemic, and immediately preceding the 2000 nationwide local
government elections, the ANC President Thabo Mbeki announced the adoption of Free Basic
Water.179 The policy was welcomed by politicians and impoverished citizens, while technocrats
have argued that it is not logistically feasible, cost-effective, or sustainable, and critics have
scathingly referred to it as “politically expedient” and “hastily conceptualised”.180
To the contrary, however, FBW can trace its lineage back through regulation and statute, all
the way to Section 27 of the Constitution, which provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to a. health care services, including reproductive health care;
b. sufficient food and water; and
c. social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their
dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.181

The Water Services Act (WSA) of 1997 includes a provision that effectuates this
Constitutional requirement by outlining the right of access to basic water supply,182 and
regulations issued by DWAF in June 2001 implement this provision of the WSA by

178

Kihato, supra n.93, at 29.
Mbeki Promises Free Water, Electricity to South Africa's Poor, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, October 8, 2000.
180
Kihato, supra n.93, at 29.
181
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 27.
182
Specifically, Section 3 of the WSA provides:
179

Right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation
(1) Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation.
(2) Every water services institution must take reasonable measures to realise these rights.
(3) Every water services authority must, in its water services development plan, provide for
measures to realise these rights.
(4) The rights mentioned in this section are subject to the limitations contained in this Act.
WSA, supra n.64, at § 3.
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defining a minimum standard for basic water supply service.183 A predecessor to FBW,
called the lifeline tariff, was envisioned in the 1997 White Paper on National Water
Policy, which was to provide the “Reserve for basic human need” free of charge.184
While the lifeline tariff was apparently never realized, it demonstrates that policymakers
were conscious of their Constitutional obligation to provide water access and that they
contemplated free or highly subsidized service provision as a potential solution. A
version of this solution was not adopted as national policy until 2001, a year after
President Mbeki made his groundbreaking announcement, but the 2003 Strategic
Framework for Water Services formally recognizes the policy of FBW
, which all l ocal
water service authorities are legally obliged to implement.185 Thus, irrespective of its

183

The regulation provides that:
Basic water supply
3. The minimum standard for basic water supply services is –
(a) the provision of appropriate education in respect of effective water use;
and
(b) a minimum quantity of potable water of 25 litres per person per day or 6 kilolitres per
household per month (i) at a minimum flow rate of not less than 10 litres per minute;
(ii) within 200 metres of a household; and
(iii) with an effectiveness such that no consumer is without a supply for more
than seven full days in any year.

DEP’T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FORESTRY, REGULATIONS RELATING TO COMPULSORY NATIONAL STANDARDS AND
MEASURES TO CONSERVE WATER §3 (2001), available at
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Notices/Water%20Services%20Act/SEC9DREG-20%20April%202001.doc (on
file with Author).
184
1997 WHITE PAPER, supra n.96, at § 6.5.3. The 1997 White Paper initiated the fundamental overhaul of water
resource policies that took place under National Water Act of 1998. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 1.2.
185
See id. at § 4.4.1. Lest the unfamiliar reader be confused by repeated references to policies and strategies, the
Strategic Framework document provides some help in navigating through this semantic quagmire: “Policies
establish the vision, overall goals and approach, legislation creates the enabling environment and strategies set out
the detail of how the policies will be implemented in order to achieve the vision and goals.” Id. at § 1.4 (emphasis
in original).
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pre-election expediency, FBW is rooted in political and legal history, and it is now firmly
entrenched in the governance of domestic water services.186
FBW requires that water service authorities provide the minimum quantity of water
for free, which has led to its characterization as a daring policy that “emerged in
opposition to international policy trends.”187 However, it is unambiguous that any water
consumed over and above the minimum quantity necessary for survival (as defined by the
government) must be paid for, in support of cost-recovery principles:
The adoption of the free basic water policy has not negated [the “user pays”] principle. On the
contrary, the free basic water policy strengthens the principle in that it clearly requires
consumption in excess of the basic water supply service to be paid for while enabling free access
by the poor to a basic water supply service necessary to sustain life.188

One of the strongest critiques of FBW is that the quantity defined by the government as the
minimum quantity necessary for survival is insufficient. The government’s policy advocates 2533 liters/person/day, depending on the size of the household, whereas the UN and the World
Health Organization both recommend a minimum of 50 liters/person/day to ensure a healthy
life.189 Critics therefore assert that FBW is actually regressive in its implementation, because an
insufficient minimum quantity provided for free, combined with payment at cost for any water

186

As of July 2001, the majority of local governments had implemented the national government’s official policy of
FBW. South Africa: Programme for 6,000 Litres of Free Water per Family Begins 1 July, BBC MONITORING, July
2, 2001.
187
Kihato, supra n.93, at 57.
188
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 4.4.1 (emphasis added). See also id. at § 4.1 (Key Principle #3)
(outlining consumer responsibility to pay for services provided over and above the free basic quantity), and at
Preface (“With this right [to a basic amount of water for free] comes a responsibility…to pay for services where
these are provided over and above a basic service.”).
189
Khan, supra n.5 ; McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26. But cf. Michael Kidd, Not a Drop to Drink:
Disconnection of Water Services for Nonpayment and the Right of Access to Water, 20(1) SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 119, 134 n.64 and associated text (2004), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sajhr/2004/kidd.pdf (citing a variety of international sources, whose estimates of
the necessary minimum quantity range from 20 – 50 liters). To put these quantities in perspective, an average bath
requires 200 liters of water, and a toilet flush uses 10-15 liters. McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26. It is
also worth noting that the South African government is clearly aware that 25 liters/person/day may not be sufficient,
as the 2003 Strategic Framework encourages water service authorities to increase the level of free water from 25
liters to 50 liters and indicates that, at some point in the future, the national government will consider boosting the
national subsidy to make this feasible. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 4.4.1.
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consumed in excess (rapid tariff hikes often kick in after the first block of free water), actually
leaves some families with higher water bills than they had before the free water policy was
introduced.190 Another regressive aspect of the policy is its calculation on a per-household basis,
rather than an individual basis, because poor households are typically larger than those in the
middle class, so the free block of water must be distributed among more people.191 Furthermore,
households with outstanding water debt are not eligible for their allocation of free water until
their debt is paid off, and families’ whose service has been disconnected for nonpayment forfeit
their right to free basic water.192 These exceptions exclude a substantial portion of the most
disadvantaged citizens in the population from free basic water, because, as noted previously,
water debts can be staggering and hundreds of thousands of families have suffered water service
cutoffs.
FBW forms part of the national government’s water strategy, but it is distributed and
paid for by local government through water service authorities.193 The policy’s financing
is slated to come from two sources: 1) cross-subsidization among users within a supply
system or within a water services area, and 2) the equitable share, which is a
Constitutionally required portion of the annual national budget allocated to local
governments.194 In reality, cross-subsidization is not a viable source of funding in
regions that do not contain a critical mass of local economic activity with consumers who
190

McDonald, No Money, No Service, supra n.26. Some support for this may be found in the facts of Manqele v.
Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council, a case first decided by the Durban High Court in February 2001. 2002
(6) SA 423 (D). In Manqele, the plaintiff had been exceeding her free basic supply of 25 liters/person/day and had
been paying for the excess in the past, but once she was no longer able to pay for the excess, she was cut off entirely
for nonpayment. See Kidd, supra n.189, at 125-26, 131.
191
Id. See also McDonald, The Theory and Practice of Cost Recovery, supra n.111 , at 29.
192
Vogt, supra n.115; Katzenellenbogen, supra n.121.
193
See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 2. See also David Jackson, Free Water 'Lifeline' For the Needy,
BUSINESS DAY (South Africa), April 8, 2004.
194
See S. AFR. CONST. ch. 13, §§ 214(1), 227(1)(a), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/96cons13.htm; STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at §
4.4.1.
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are purchasing water in bulk.195 Most rural municipalities fall within this category, and
these are the regions most likely to need financing for additional service delivery
infrastructure, in addition to the costs of operation and maintenance faced by all
municipalities.196 Financing of FBW is further complicated by the cash-strapped status
of local governments, most of which were running at a deficit as of 2000.197 Meanwhile,
private companies involved in the South African water service sector are arguing that
providing a minimum quantity of water for free is not economically viable, thereby
realizing the fears of those in the anti-privatization camp, who argue that a private
company should not be making life-or-death decisions according to the bottom line,
which is arguably what is at stake in the dispensation of free basic water to extremely
poor communities.198
Thus, the importance of national funding in order to realize the provision of free basic
water is magnified – the latest water services strategy document indicates that the
government is aware of this, since it notes that the equitable share was to have been
temporarily increased for the 2003-04 period specifically to help local governments
implement free basic services.199 As of 2003, millions of people living in shantytowns
and rural areas still had not been provided with free water and reports ofservice cuts
remained widespread among the communities most at risk ofcontracting w ater-borne
diseases.200 By April 2004, 20 million people were still projected to receive water (read:
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Kihato, supra n.93, at 21.
See id. at 27.
197
Khan, supra n.5.
198
See Ford, supra n.71.
199
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 4.4.1.
200
See Stoppard, supra n.130. See also Thompson, supra n.134, and Carolien van der Voorden, Free Water in SA
Remains a Dream, 21(2) WATERLINES 27 (2002).
196
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had not yet received free water),201 and as of the time of this paper, according to DWAF’s
own figures, over 15 million people still have not been served with free basic water, and
13 million of these people are classified as “poor”. This is 33% of the total population,
and 45% of the ‘poor’ population, still not served with a minimum quantity of free water,
which is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that 95% of the nation’s water service
authorities are reported as having implemented FBW.202

C. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Water
The South African Constitution is admired as one of the most progressive in the world,
because the Bill of Rights enshrines numerous socioeconomic rights, including rights of access
to land, adequate housing, social security, health care, food, and water.203 The South African
Constitutional Court has ruled that these enumerated rights are justiciable, and in so doing, has
departed from the historical divisions in international human rights jurisprudence between
political and civil rights on the one hand, which are traditionally considered justiciable, and
economic and cultural rights on the other, which have been considered presumptively
nonjusticiable.204
The Constitution obligates the State to take legislative or other reasonable measures to
progressively realize each of these rights, and while adjudication of these rights necessarily
requires the courts to issue judgments that implicate the government’s budgetary decisions, the
Court has rejected the theory that enforcing socioeconomic rights in court overly politicizes the
judiciary and interferes with the doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative,
201

Jackson, supra n.193.
These figures are from DWAF’s website devoted to FBW, which is updated daily, at
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/FreeBasicWater.
203
S. AFR. CONST. ch.2, §§ 25-27. See also Vogt, supra n. n.115, and Klug, supra n.42 .
204
Shadrack B. O. Gutto, Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of Implementing/Enforcing Socioeconomic Rights in
South Africa, 4 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 79, 89 (1998).
202
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executive, and judicial branches of government.205 Nevertheless, the Court has carefully tailored
its judgments and its analyses of socioeconomic rights to preserve the balance of power in its
Constitutional review.206 This trend surely reflects prudential considerations by the justices
about both the institutional competency and legitimacy of the judiciary – it may also indicate a
measure of doubt about the utility of judicial review over the administration of budgetary
resources that are being deployed to implement socioeconomic rights. As one scholar notes,
[T]o date there have been very few constitutional challenges to the basic inequalities which are
part of apartheid's legacy. Furthermore, it is not clear what a constitution can do in this regard.
While a constitution may guarantee rights and ensure oversight of government decisions, it cannot
address the basic problem of lack of resources.207

1. A Roadmap for Litigating Socioeconomic Rights
Since 2000, the Constitutional Court has issued several monumental decisions respecting
the rights to housing, health care, and social security.208 This court has not yet presided over a
case litigating the Constitutional right to water, but a lower court ruled in 2002 that an alleged
violation of the right to water is a justiciable issue, just like the rights to housing and health care
205

Id. at 81; De Lange, supra n.5.
See Wesson, supra n.163, at 285 (observing that the court in Grootboom, infra n.208, sought “to protect the
interests of vulnerable sectors of society, while also leaving the primary responsibility for co-ordinating socioeconomic programs in the hands of the state,” and that this strikes “an appropriate balance between the competing
roles of the state and the judiciary”). See also Kende, supra n.20, at 149:
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and
economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and
focused role for the courts, namely, to require the State to take measures to meet its constitutional
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such
determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in
themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.
Id.
207
Klug, supra n.42, at 818 (emphasis added).
208
Gov’t of Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/grootboom1/grootboom1.pdf (adjudicating the right to housing and finding that the
state housing program was unconstitutional because it did not make reasonable provision for those persons most
immediately in desperate need) [hereinafter Grootboom]; Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002
(10) BCLR 1033 (CC), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/tac/tac.pdf (adjudicating the right to health
care services and holding that the right to health care is subject to the availability of resources, so the government is
not required by the Constitution to provide life-saving specialty services that it cannot afford) [hereinafter TAC];
Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC), available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/khosa/khosa.pdf (adjudicating the right to social security) [hereinafter Khosa].
206
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that had thus far been asserted in the Constitutional Court.209 This raises the question of what
exactly it means in practice to have a justiciable right to water protected by the Constitution. The
existing socioeconomic rights cases provide some useful guidance for analyzing the contours of
this right. It is well-established that the rights and duties enumerated in the Bill of Rights must
be analyzed in light of the Constitution as a whole, that the substantive provisions and
implementation provisions of each right must be read jointly, and that the rights must be
considered within their relevant social and historical context.210 The right to water is physically
positioned amidst the cluster of socioeconomic rights in the Bill of Rights, including housing,
health care, and social security, and the right to water shares an implementation provision with
the rights to health care and social security, which is identically worded to the implementation
provision for the right to housing.211 Furthermore, the right to water shares a social and
historical context with rights to housing, health care, and social security, each of which is a
crucial aspect of a humane standard of living and a necessary precondition to improving the
socioeconomic circumstances of the impoverished majority. Thus, it is reasonable to extrapolate
the contours of a right to water from the Constitutional Court’s holdings on these other rights,
which jointly provide a roadmap for adjudication of socioeconomic rights.
The Constitution does not provide individuals with specific rights to access specific
resources; instead, it places an obligation on the government to take reasonable action to achieve
209

Highveldridge Residents Concerned Party v Highveldridge Transitional Local Council, 2002 (6) SA 66 (T). See
also Kidd, supra n.189, at 123, n.18 and associated text.
210
See Grootboom, supra n.208 at ¶21-22 (analyzing the substantive and implementing provisions of the right to
housing (§ 26) in tandem) (“[Each of] the…rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (which contains the Bill of
Rights)…must be construed in its context…Interpreting a right in its context requires the consideration of two types
of context. On the one hand, rights must be understood in their textual setting. This will require a consideration of
Chapter 2 and the Constitution as a whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood in their social and
historical context.”). See also Slye, supra n.163, at 671-72.
211
The implementation provision for the right to health care, food, water, and social security states: “The state must
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of each of these rights.” S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 27(2). The implementation provision for the right to housing
states: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of this right.” S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 26(2).
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these generalized rights for the population.212 Thus, to get through the courthouse doors, a
person who is deprived of access to sufficient potable water must assert that the government’s
action (or inaction) is unconstitutional within the meaning of Section 27. A governmental action
takes the form of a plan, policy, or program (PPP) that is designed to achieve the “progressive
realisation” of Constitutional rights. The Court uses reasonableness as the measuring stick to
evaluate a PPP,213 and its expectations for reasonably progressive realization are bifurcated into
a) measures taken to implement those rights for the general public (the general component) and
b) measures taken to implement those rights for the desperately poor citizens who are most
immediately in need of assistance (the indigent component).214
For evaluating the general component of the PPP, the reasonableness test consists of three
elements.215 First, the PPP must contain substantive measures that are comprehensive, coherent,
balanced, flexible, and feasible.216 It must have a workable legal and administrative
infrastructure (mere framework legislation is insufficient), and it cannot exclude large swaths of
people – a PPP that excludes a “significant segment of society” is presumptively unreasonable,
and in light of the overall purpose of the PPP, the state must provide relevant justifications for
excluding groups of people.217 Second, the rate of implementation must reflect “progressive
realisation” – this means that in order for the government to satisfy its Constitutional obligations,

212

See discussion, supra n.163 (regarding individual rights versus group rights).
Wesson, supra n.163, at 287.
214
The state has a special obligation to attend to the needs of the very poor, who cannot afford to pay for the most
basic socioeconomic rights. Slye, supra n.163, at 676-77.
215
Slye, supra n.163, at 617 (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶¶ 21,38, and S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 26(2)).
216
Wesson, supra n.163, at 287 (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶¶ 40,41,43).
217
See Slye, supra n.163, at 673 (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶ 78); id. at 672 (analyzing Grootboom at ¶¶
42, 43); Wesson, supra n.163, at 288 (jointly analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, TAC,supra n.208, and Khosa,
supra n.208); id. at 295, n.56 and associated text (exploring how the court’s decision in Khosa sharpens the
reasonableness analysis).
213
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it must move “as expeditiously as possible” toward its goal, but it need not achieve its goal
immediately.218 Third, the government’s obligation is subject to the availability of resources.219
In contrast, in order to withstand reasonableness scrutiny by the Court, the indigent
component of the PPP must be implemented on a fast track (“with due regard to the urgency of
the situations it is intended to address”),220 it must provide relief for a significant number of
people, it must provide immediate relief to some of those people, though not all,221 and most
importantly, it must consist of measures devised, implemented, supervised, and funded by the
State.222 Thus, while the State’s financial obligations to implement the general component of a
PPP are limited by its determination of the availability of resources, the State has much less
budgetary discretion with respect to the indigent component of the PPP. The funding for the
indigent component must consist of a reasonable part of the national budget for the overall PPP,
and it must be given financial priority, even if doing so compromises the government’s other
stated objectives that drive the general component of the PPP.223
If a party sues the government regarding the constitutionality of its PPP, the plaintiff will
bear the burden of proving that either component of the government’s PPP is unreasonable,224
and should the plaintiff prevail, the only remedy the court can provide is an order requiring the
government to devise a new PPP that is reasonable – the intricacies of a remedial PPP are left to
the legislative branch that was found in violation of the Constitution in the first instance, but the
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Kende, supra n.20, at 144 (quoting Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶ 45 (in turn citing United Nations Committee
ESCR, general comment 3, 9 (1990) (comment on implementation of Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm))).
219
Slye, supra n.163, at 671.
220
Wesson, supra n.163, at 288.
221
Id. (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶ 68). See also Slye, supra n.163, at 678 (also analyzing Grootboom
at ¶68).
222
See Slye, supra n.163, at 673 (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶ 96).
223
See Wesson, supra n.163, at 288 (analyzing Grootboom, supra n.208, at ¶ 66). See also Kende, supra n.20, at
145 (also analyzing Grootboom at ¶ 66).
224
Slye, supra n.163, at 680.
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Court may provide some specific recommendations as guidance.225 An arduous burden of proof
and a lack of specific relief surely will depress the incentive for individual citizens to litigate.226
However, the lower courts have demonstrated a willingness to construe standing requirements
liberally in water rights cases, so the Constitutional Court does remain open as a venue for
parties to bring public impact litigation.227

2. The Viability of Litigating the Right to Water
The South African government appears to be mindful ofits Constitutional obligation to
provide access to water. From the inception of water’s legal transformation, the various policy
documents, statutes, and regulations acknowledge the Constitutional mandate and the need to
meet the population’s most basic water requirements. The ongoing inequities in water access
and widespread water service cutoffs highlight the government’s failure to fulfill its
Constitutional obligation, but they do not necessarily demonstrate a Constitutional violation,
within the rubric of socioeconomic Constitutional claims brought before the Constitutional
Court.
The most immediately Constitutionally suspect program is that of cost-recovery, which
drives service cutoffs. However, Professor Michael Kidd of University of Kwazulu-Natal
Faculty of Law has recently analyzed the constitutionality of water service cutoffs and concluded

225

Id. (analyzing TAC, supra n.208).

226

This combination of rights and remedies ultimately provides only a limited incentive for poor
communities to use litigation as a means for enforcing socioeconomic rights, since the remedy will
be, at best, an order that the state replace an unreasonable policy with a reasonable one. Such an
order may well fail to provide any immediate or tangible benefit to poor individuals.
Id. at 679.
227
See Highveldridge, supra n.209. Advocates of judicial restraint would shutter at this statement. See, e.g., Kende,
supra n.20 (arguing that “historical original intent” in South Africa is that in the long run, the elected branches, not
the courts, should be the “primary engines of social transformation.”).
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that, while service cutoffs are a prima facie limitation on the Constitutional right to water,228
water service providers can justify this limitation, because a significant source of funding in the
water service sector comes from cross-subsidization, and thus,
[T]hose who fail to pay their accounts are compromising the water services provider’s ability to
provide basic services to other users. Limitation of water use is therefore not just a manner of debt
collection (and if this were the only reason for discontinuing a water supply it would be unlikely to
meet the requirements of the limitations clause) but part of the exercise of balancing water access
rights between all the users of the resource.229

As Professor Kidd clearly recognizes, any Constitutional analysis of government water programs
will involve a detailed examination of financial considerations, especially since the Bill of
Rights, as interpreted by the justices of the Constitutional Court, requires sufficient funding of at
least the indigent component of a program. Therefore, it is worth exploring the funding structure
of the government’s water programs in more detail.
Each province is entitled under the Constitution to an equitable share of the National
Revenue Fund, which is comprised of the money received by the national government.230 The
national parliament distributes this fund among the provincial and local governments and
municipalities via the annual Division of Revenue Act.231 However, the national government
does not have unlimited discretion in its budgetary allocations. Before passing this legislation,
the parliament must consult with provincial and local governments and a national agency called
the Financial and Fiscal Commission.232 Furthermore, the Constitution provides some guidance
228

Kidd, supra n.189 , at 121.
Id. at 133. However, he goes on to note that completely disconnecting service so as to deny an indigent person of
his or her free basic minimum quantity would violate the Constitution, and in addition, to the extent that the current
quantification of free basic water – set at 25 liters/person/day – is insufficient to meet basic human needs, this may
also violate section 27. Id. at 132, n.57 and associated text.
230
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 13, § 213.
231
§ 214; see also, e.g., Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2004, GG vol. 465, no. 26222, of 31 March 2004, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2004/a5-04.pdf. It was the Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2002 that created the
impetus to ultimately phase DWAF out of direct water service provision and financing and transfer operation and
financing of water service schemes to local governments. See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra n.75, at § 1.2
(discussing Division of Revenue Act 5 of 2002, GG vol. 441, no. 23290, of 28 March 2002, available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a5-02.pdf); see also NWRS, supra n.69, at ch. 3, § 3.9.4.1.
232
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 13, § 214(2).
229

48

DRAFT COPY – March 2005

in this determination, mandating that legislation quantifying the equitable share take into
account, among other things:
•
•

the general obligation “to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able
to provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to them”233
the localities’ fiscal capacity, development needs, and income disparities234

Thus, the Constitution bequeaths each local government with the right to receive sufficient
funding assistance from the national government “to enable it to provide basic services and
perform the functions allocated to it.”235
The NWA does not provide much guidance for the funding of local water service
provision.236 It merely states that the Minister of DWAF may provide financial assistance in the
form of grants, loans, or subsidies appropriated by Parliament and designed to further the
purposes of the Act, and that in so doing, the Minister must consider the needs for equity and
redressing the results of past discrimination.237 Likewise, the WSApermits but does not require
the Minister to provide financial assistance (grants, loans, or subsidies) to water service
institutions. 238
Consumer water tariffs (water use charges) served as the primary source of funding for
water service provision up until 2000, when the local government elections implemented the
‘final phase in the local government transformation process’.239 Post-2000, the local government
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The National Water Resources Strategy lays out the financial implications of implementing the provisions of the
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water use charges) and allocations from the government’s Exchequer Account (funding from the national
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services schemes to local governments.” NWRS, supra n.69, at ch. 3, §§ 3.9.1, 3.9.4, 3.9.4.1.
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equitable share serves as a significant source of funding for basic water services.240 The
Strategic Framework commits the national government to continue providing financial support to
local governments’ efforts to extend access to a basic water supply, and it lays out three sources
of national funding: the local government equitable share (the annual, unconditional grant,
which the local government has ultimate discretion to distribute among its various functions as it
sees fit), municipal infrastructure grants (conditional capital grants earmarked for building water
supply facilities), and capacity-building grants (presumably designed to help local governments
increase citizen participation in the management and operation of water services).241
An interesting confluence of events occurred in South Africa at the turn of the
millennium, and the manner in which the legislative and executive branches of the government
have responded to these events may not be coincidental, but rather, evidence that leaders in the
public (water) sector are aware of possible Constitutional suits and laying the groundwork to
successfully defend against them. In 2000, the Constitutional Court issued its most sweeping
and formative judgment on socioeconomic rights to date in Government of Republic of South
Africa v. Grootboom, in which it held the government in violation of the Constitution for its
failure to provide immediate housing for the most desperate and needy citizens.242 That same
year, a massive cholera epidemic swept the populace and came to a head politically with the
President’s announcement of a Free Basic Water policy.243 Lastly, nationwide local government
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Id. See also Kidd, supra n.189, at 133 n.61 (“The ‘equitable share’ of national revenue to municipalities,
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elections concluded the final phase in the local government transformation process that
decentralized many functions and responsibilities, including water services, to the local level.244
FBW appears to be designed to satisfy the ‘indigent component’ requirement of the
government’s overarching long-term plan to extend water services to every member of the
population. For reasons discussed in Part IV-B, cross-subsidization at the local level cannot
sufficiently finance service extension and provision of free water, especially in rural regions,
where poverty is greatest, water is scarce, and infrastructure is the least-developed. Thus, even
with the adoption of FBW, the national government would still be vulnerable to Constitutional
attack, if it did not make a concerted effort to support local governments’ efforts financially.
Two years after FBW was formally adopted, the government explicitly laid out sources of
financing, in addition to cost-recovery, in its 2003 policy document, the Strategic Framework for
Water Services. This document emphasizes for the first time the national government’s
commitment to funding the nationwide effort to eliminate the backlog in basic water services and
improve the level of service provision over time, and it articulates the specific sources of funding
available.245 Furthermore, it indicates that national funding through the equitable share was to
have been increased for the period 2003-04, specifically to help local governments implement
free basic services.246 The Strategic Framework makes only a passing reference to the
Constitutional Court’s Grootboom decision, namely, that Grootboom requires it to provide water
services and to have a special program or pay special attention to those in dire need.247
Interestingly, though, its predecessor, the Draft Water Services White Paper, discussed the
244
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financial and programmatic implications of the Grootboom decision on water services much
more extensively:
The recent “Grootboom” Constitutional Court judgement implied that where a municipality has
failed to progressively plan and implement strategies for addressing the needs of its consumers,
and where a municipality does not have the financial resources to address these needs through a
strategy of progressive realisation, it is the responsibility of provincial government, in the first
instance, and thereafter national government to support, strengthen and regulate, to ensure the
provision of basic services to those persons in dire need. All three spheres thus have a real
responsibility and obligation to see to the realisation of basic rights to water supply and sanitation
and must exercise their roles in a manner that indeed provides for the progressive realisation of
those rights.248

This draft White Paper was ultimately supplanted by the Strategic Framework and carries no
legal weight or policy influence. It is not entirely clear why the DWAF chose to downplay the
level to which the Grootboom decision was driving the formulation and articulation of national
water policy in its final policy document. Nevertheless, the government’s actions since
Grootboom (adoptingan indigent component to its overall water services program and making
explicit commitments to fund this program in its most recent policy documents) will most likely
satisfy the kind of inquiry the Constitutional Court is likely to engage in when presiding in the
first instance over a water rights case that facially challenges the government’s water
programs.249

VI. CONCLUSION
In 2001, a scholar of South African water rights stated rather poignantly that, “there has
been a formal governmental commitment to human rights principles in the constitution and
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This article does not explore the viability of challenging the local governments’ policy of cost-recovery, as
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ensuing legislation, rules, and regulations. However, for human rights principles to be realized
in fact, there must also be a commitment of financial resources and cooperation among federal
and local officials…”250 Four years later, the national government has legally proclaimed a
commitment of financial resources to extend water access to the population, and it has intimated
that provision of at least a minimum of free basic water to all its citizens is within the country’s
financial capacity.251 Time will tell whether these commitments on paper translate into faster
water service extension and better water service delivery, and thereby a safer, more humane life
for the millions of citizens still collecting water from unclean sources for their basic survival
needs. In light of the government’s most recent programs and policies, it is not clear how
effective a suit in the Constitutional Court would be at improving water access and water equity.
It has been noted that, in South Africa, “[l]itigation and judicial activism, however progressive,
can only play a limited contributory role to social transformation.”252 In other words, to the
extent that the current pace and quality of extending and providing water services is
unsatisfactory, the next big push for more equity in water access, and collateral improvements in
the life conditions of South Africa’s most impoverished citizens, may need to come from civil
society in an organized effort to give existing water laws more redistributive bite. This is a
simultaneously over-simplistic and overwhelming conclusion, but a historically recurrent one
nevertheless. A former minister of the Department of Water Affairs once described water as the
foundation of democracy and social stability in South Africa.253 If it is ever possible to mobilize
the population around a salient political issue and effectively pressure elected officials to change
the course of democratic governance, surely access to water can serve as motivation.
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